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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the course of history, there have been many great
military leaders.
as criticized.

Each of these has been praised as well

One of the most controversial of these

military figures was General Douglas MacArthur.!
This controversial figure, at the outbreak of war in
the Pacific, was placed in one of the most responsible
positions of the war••Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces
in the Southwest Pacific.

The war in this area centered

around the battle for the Philippine Islands.

The battle

for these islands was an epic of heroic fighting, great
strategy, and much suffering.
discords and frictions.

It was also marred by many

Theee disagreements produced high

level errors which greatly affected the war in the Pacific.
Douglas MacArthur, a man surrounded by many legends and
beliefs, was the focus of some of these conflicts.
It is difficult for people to speak of MacArthur in
a neutral manner; they either have great admiration or
great dislike for him.

He is looked at in various ways by

lGeorge c. Kenney, !!1!. cArthur.!
Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1951 , p. 10.

!!!m!•

(New York:

2

different people .

Some speak of him with great adoration,

while others describe hi s tremendous ego .
The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at
the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur s ince the outbreak of World War II .

In order to do thi s, it will be

necessary to review the events in the general ' s career
through World War II, during the occupation of Japan, and
the war in Korea .

This study will consider al s o the reason-

ing behind many of the decisions and movements made by
General MacArthur .

This will mean a study of the general's

personal qualities and dominant c.h aracter:J. s tics in order to
gain insight into the behavior which influenced the s e move s.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND FOR LEADERSHIP
General Douglas MacArthur was born at Fort Little
Rock, Arkan as, on January 26, 1880, where his f thert
Arthur MacArthur, wa · stationed. 1
In his earliest years, Dougla$ wa attracted to the
military.

His earliest memories were of the sounds of

guns and warriors t elling of heroic charges during the
Civil War . 2 MacArthur stated that one of his. first memories

was of a 300-mile march made to guard the fords of the Rio
Grande fron1 the danger of raids from Geronimo's ma.raudit1g
Indians . l
At the age of sixteen, Douglas became a cadet at
West Texas

~filita.:ry

Academy at S n

Antonio, Texas .

His

academic records were outs tandingJ and he was an all·round
athlete.

MaoArthu;r was a football hero; he was the key man

on the 1896 team. 4
1Fran~ie trevelyan Miller~ DouglfS MacArthur, ~isht~f

~ ~Ieedg~,

(Philadelphia: John C. Winston

Co . ~

e . 1945),

p . 31 .
2

-

Ibid.

3
Doug1a-s MacArthur, R,emi.niscencu, (New York:
Hill Book Company, c, 1964), p. 15.
4

Miller, op. ci t .,

p~

36.

~1cGraw..

4

Douglas MacArthur was appointed to West Point from
Wi sconsin at the age of eighteen.

In 1898 hi s mother took

him to Milwaukee to take the West Point examinations.

He

achieved first place in the examination.5
MacArthur entered We s t Point on June 13, 1899, and
began to ri se rapidly . 6

He became a corporal in his second

year, First Sergeant of Company A in his thir d , and First
Captain of the Corps a s a Firs t Classman . 7 On June 11,
1903 , MacArthur g:r·a dua ted as a second 1 ieutenant of Engineers.
He s tated that the words of Elihu Root rang in his ears .

Elihu Root said:
Before you leave the Army, according t o
a l l precedents in our his tory, you will
be engaged in another war . It i s bound
t o come, and will come. Prepare your
country for that war . 8
The first assignment given MacArthur was to the
P~lippine s.

He was with the Third Battalion of Engineers

on Guimaras Island .

The main task was the clearing of the

--')c"'lark Lee and Richard Henshel, Dou.Jll.l!! MacArthur ,
( fir s t edition; New York: Hen~y Holt and Company , c. 1952) ,
p . 29 .
6
7
8

Miller,~ ·

Lee, .22 .

ci~ .,

.£.!!. ,

p . 54 .

p . 31.

MacArthm:- ' ~ cit~' p . _28 .

5

jungles in order to lay the foundations for civilization.9
MacArthur was commended for his task here, and he later
stated that it was here that he attained much knowledge of
the Philippines which was to be very valuable later on.

He

stated:
During my tour of a year I engaged in
typical engineering duties in many parts
of the islands. I worked on surveys at
Tacloban, harbor improvements in Manila
Bay, fortification installations off
Corregidor, traveries over the steaming
wooded hills of Bataan . lO
Early in October of 1905, Douglas MacArthur was
ordered to join his father as an observer in the RussoJapanese War.

The Japanese armies had forced the Russians

back until , after many months of combat, they stood at the
gates of Mukden in Manchuria .

It was here that the officer

came under heavy fire with the Japanese troops.

During this

time, he learned much of the Japanese military tactics . 11
MacArthur was suspicious of future Japanese movements .
later stated :
• •• I had the uneasy feeling that the
haughty feudalistic Samurai who were their
leaders, were , through their victories,

-

9tbid .
10tbid.

-

llMiller, ~ c::it., pp. 75·76.

He

6

planting the seeds of eventual Japanese
conquest of the Orient,
ving conquered
Korea and Formosa , it W&$ more than -evident that they would eventually s trike
for control of th~ Pacific and domination
of the Far Eas t.l
In the fall of 1906, t4acArthur
camp to lTeSident 'Xh odore Roosevel.t,

w s ppointed ide-deThis appointment was

of great interet to the young o·ficer because it was the
first time h beccwe associated with a leading political.

fi8ure . 13
~~cArthur's

Dougla$

force in his life.

father seemed to be th

controlling

Hi _- f ther ' s untimely death on June 2,

1909 , was a crucial time for hirn. 14 Arthur MacArthu:r died
while he wa

spe king at th

Fifteenth A niversary of the

famous '1'-«enty li"ourth W:tscon in , which was composed of 90

old Civil War Veteran • MacArthur te 1 of tbe

cene

the impact.
In the middle of the room the Rever nd
Paul B. Jenkins began to repeat the
Lord t e I'r yer • . • tho e 90 old men ~rho
cl follow~d him up Mi sio\1ary Ridge and
into the bl~zing fire of
d0zen b ttle-

fiel

knelt by the

ioe of their old

cQlUl'Mln er a nd joined in. t-Jhen the prayer
n ed, he was dead . The adjutant ,
Captain Edwin Par$ons 11 toot< from the wall

_ _1.,..,l,...Ma~
~·-c~Ar· ·-th'!""'·ur ~ .2.2 ·' e ~~ . , p. 31.

13Iptg. ' P• 33 •
14Mi ller , £2 · £!!. , p . 86 .

nd

7

the battle-torn fla g that he had so
gallantly carried and t~apped it around
the General. Captain Par on stood in
silence for a moment , gazing at his
de d commander , then fell fort-lard over
the body and , within two week$$ passed
on . My whole world changed that night .
Never have I been able to heal the
wound in my heart . l5
Re lations

be~een

Mexico and America were rapidly

deteriorating, and Mexican raiders began arre s ting and
molesting Americans legally on Mexican soil .

On April 21 ,

1914, American sailor _ and m rines were sent to seize the
city of Vera Cruz . l6

There were t hree locomotives behind

Mexican lines t hat MacArthur thought should be captured .
He al so thought that the reconnaissance of the area would
be of value in case of war .
j ob .

MacArthur had a plan to do the

Di s guiMing 1 himself as . a va grant , he succeeded in

penetrating the enemy lines and locating the
risk of hi s life • 17

e~gines

at the

lie had been warned that Washington did

not want t-1ar, and that they might not lil<:e it.

The young

officer went ahead wi th the expedition and of its outcome
he s tated:

--,'3Ma.eAr thur , .212. . cit • , p • 3 •
16 Ibid . , p . 40 .
- ,- ~
- -, ..£..±._.
- .tt
-11-Mil1 er

, p•

-5-•

8

General Wood recommended me for the Medal
of Honor . The War Department disa greed •.
• • In decidi g to make the reconnaissance
I may have been right or I may have been
wrong. War did not materialize and the
utility of our exploits would never be
knm·m , but even my old frontier friends
would h~v.e agreed that it was a wild
ni ght . : • . . I was promoted to major shortly
after my return to Washington and again
chosen for detail on the General Staff .
Perhaps those gents in the WaS Department
were no t so r ough after all.l
When Ameri ca en tered World War I, troops were needed
in Europe as fas t a s possible .

Secretary of War Newton D.

Baker conceive d of t he idea of forming a division from the
National Guards composed of men from 48 states . 19

The

General Staff had voted predominantly agains t thi s idea .
MacArthur was for t he idea, believing that the Guard could
be strengthened by volunt ary enlistments which could be
trained to comba t e ffectivene s s . 20

Secretary of War Baker

and MacArthur took this idea to Pre s ident Wil s on , who went
along with it .

When they left the President , Baker a s ked

MacArthur what he con sidered t1e best method of carrying
out the proposal .

MacArthur stated, "I suggest that we

take units from the different states so that a division
18MacArthur,
I

E.E. ~

ill·, pp . 42-43.

1-9u"11
,.,1. er , .9.R . cit • , p. 95 .

20

MacArthur,

_2E,

ill· ,

P • 44 •

9

would stretch over the

t-~hole

country like

that time on, this outfit was known as the

rainbow . "

From

inb~W.-~1Yi.sion..21

Brigadier General Wi lliam A. Mann was selected to
command the divi

ion ~

with MacArthur a

Chief of ·Staff .

MacArthur took charge of organizing > training , and evaluating
it .

This command was part of the American Expeditionary

Force under the command of General John J . Pershing . 22
MacArthur

tated that General

ershing:

•. • • r ose to the hi ghest flights of his
profes ion . He ins pired a self ... respect
for our nati011al forces and a foreign
reeognitior1 of our military might w ioh
has properly ·placed ~s fully equal to
the b s t of the 1uman race • My memorie
of him sustained and strengthened me
during many a lone ly and· bitter mo ent
of the Pacific and Korean War • 23

Dougla MacArthur led the · en into battle at Bacarrot
I

and Reehicoutt in France, and was cited for gallantry after
leading a large

ssa.ul t .

Me

w s decorated

and Amer:f.ca on June 2 , 1918 , and wa
of Brigadier Generat. 24

22T...,.

,1.&1

'

•t
.2e E.!..:.
' p • 33 •
i

23 MacArthur, £?.£• cit ., p. 48 ,

24

Mille:r-,

~ -cit . ,

p . 98 .

by both France

promoted to the rank

10
The Rainbow Divisiotl withst od large a saults ·at the
Champagne-Marne Defensive .
to the

ttention of his

MacArthur'

s t rategy was brought

uperiors, and he was placed in

command of the Eighty-Fourth Brigade.

He struck deci ive

blows, and advanced to the M.eu e River in two days .
the Armistice was

When

igned , he led hi men into Germany with

the army of occupatiou .25
There wa

some critic ism of MacArthur's brea.king of

certain regulations.
weapon or gas mas •

It was said that
HacArthu

e~plai

e never carried a
s that in thi

way:

• • • I wore no iron helmet becaufie it hurt
my he d. I carried no gas mask because it
ha pered my movments. I ~ut unarmed because
it waa not my purpose to engage it .ersonal
combat, but t:o d rect others. I 1sed
riding crop out of long habit on the plains.
I fought from the front ae l could not ·
.ffestively manipulate my troops from the
rea:nZ6

'l'hi· points to the general's way of pla.cin ·his own wants

and judgme ts above those of his

uperiors or army

regula~

tions .
had ·ought w 11, had been severly wounded, gassed

26

cArthur,

.2.2 ~

cit . , p . 70 .

11
t wice, and became noted as a daring leader.

In 1918, he

became totally blinded as a result of a mustard gas attack.
MacArthur refused to go to the hospital and wore a blindfold
for days .

In a few days, his eyesight was restored. 27

In

1919, he returned home .to cheering crowds; he fulfilled his
own

dictum, "Only t hose are fit to live who are not afraid

to die . " 28
Upon returning from Europe, MacArthur was appointed
Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West
Point .

The academy wa.s in bad shape .

In fact , there was a

question before Congress as t o whether t he United States
would need West Point or Annapolis any longer . 29
The job of reorganization was a delicate one, for
there was opposition .

MacArthur not only had trouble with

Congress, but also with the tradition-minded professors who
felt that he was an upstart .

His success

't~as

complete, for

he constructed a new West Point in the spirit of the old one,
bringing the curriculum to modern standards and increasing
21Lee , EE •

£!!., p . 35 .

28Ipid .
29Bob Considine , General Douglas MacArthur, (Greenwich,
Connecticut : Fawcett Publications Inc . , c . 1964) , pp . 27-28~

12
the requ1rements.30

MacArthur stated:

The highest tandards of honor were to be
demanded as the only solid foundation of
a military career--a code of individual
conduct which would maintain the reput tion and well•being of the whole-~a
personal responsibility to his mate , to
his community, and above all to his
country . In many businesses and professions the welfare of the individual
is the chief object, but in the military
profession the safety and honor of the
tate becomes paramount . In the final
analysi · of the West Foi11t product,
char cter i$ the most precious component . 31
In 1921, MacArthur reported to the War Department th
Academy was faced with new demands.

t

the

These demands had to do

with the producing of effective officers 1n preparation for

any future war,32

In- 1925, MacArthur was chosen a member of the

court~

marti 1 that convicted Brigadier General William B. Mitchell
of in ubordin!ltion.

lie referred to this task as none of the

most distasteful orders 1 ever reeeived . "33

The charges

30i'raz1er Hunt, Ma£Arthu:t" AUS! the war Agal'llst :J.f2!n,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944)~ p. 8 •
..3l:rr5iaArthur) .92, cit . ,; P• 60,

32rrank Kelley and Cor.nelius Ryan, MacArthur, Man of
~ctio.n, (Garden City, New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc . ,
19505, p . 86.
33

- .--.
MacArthur, ,5!2 11 Cl t . , p . 8S .

13

were made against Mitchell because he insisted on the development of air power

gain t order

to stop from his superiors.3 4

MacArthur stated:
I was thoroughly in accord with the concept
of the massive power of the air and that
its development should he greatly accelerated
• . . • It 16 part of my military philosophy
that a senior officer should not be s ilenced
for being at variance with his superiors in
rank and with accepted doctrine , l have
always felt that the country's interest was
paramount; and that when a ranking officer,
out of purely patriotic ®tives, risks his
own personal future :ln such opposi tion , he
should not be summarily suppressed • • • • The
individual may be martyred, but his thoughts
live on. , ... When the -verdict was reached,
many believed I had betrayed my friend . • • •
Nothing could be further from the truth. I
did what l could in his behalf and ~ helped
save him from dismissal, That he was wrong
in the violence of hie language i s selfevident; tha.t he was right in hie· !~e sis is
equally true and incontrovertible.

On OetGber 30, 1930, Douglas

~cArthur

Chief of Staff of the United States

Army.

was appointed

Thi~_ appoin~ent

made him, at 50 years of age, the youngest Chief of Staff
in the history of the United States A:rmy. 36
ll/ith this appointment, MacArthur made a tour of

34tee",

.2,2.

,eiJi. , p. 43 .

3 .5MacArtbur, .22, c;i,t,, PP• 85•86 .
36

~-

Considine, .22• cit., p. 36 .

14

Europe, meeting with the military leaders atad inspecting
their armies.

Upon hi

return , MacArthur found himself in

the mid t of a battle t-11 th Congre s over modernizing the

Army.37

The general

ppeared before Congressional committees

time and again warning that the nation needed a sufficient
army in order to rank high among the armie

of the world .38

National dissatisf ction began to grow due
that million

sion.

t '

the fact

of people were out of work during the depres•

Many war veterans marched on Washington seeking to

influence Congress to grant a ca•h bonus for veterans .
tension began to mount; there wa

The

bloodshed and killing.

MaoArthuxo, watching all this, stated:
If the President gives me orders to act,
I would not give this distasteful job to
any other off:lcel:' of the United States Army.
lfanything hould go wrong; it will be the
kiss of death for that officer's future . 39
When the order came, MacArthur mounted hi s horse, taking tt-uo

officers with him: Major Dwight D. Eisenhower and Major
They broke up the encampment of marchers

George s . Patton .

with tear gas and the flat side of sabera. 40
-~7Milier~ .9.1?.•

38considine~

39

Lee, OE •

£ll.,

p . 123.

!2· £!!., pp . 39"40.

.
E.!£.•,

p . 56 .

40Miller, !2• cit ., p . 12 7.

15
Intimate friend

told of how MacArthur went into the Bonus

Army encampment

t

night and lent money to needy soldiers

who fought with him in the American Exped tionary Forae .41
The remainder of hi

term a

Chief of St ff wa

spent

trying to get Congress to do something about defenses .
MacArthur s tates:
1 stormed, begged , ranted. and roared; 1
lick d the boots of certain gentle·
men to g t funds for moto~ieatiGn and
m c ni2 tion and air pow r . , • •42
a~0st

What he w.

1

to $alvage wa · due only to backing

given him by Pre$1dent Frankliu

• Roo$evelt , who persuaded

him to stay on for an additional year aft r his four year
term had come

tQ

an e·nd. 4.3

42MacArthur, J.e• c~t . • p , 99 .
4 3Lee , tn.• t:it ., P• 60 .

CHAP'l'ER Ill

MACARTHUR PREPARES THE PHILIPPINES FOR WAR
\~1en

Manuel

uezon was elected Pre ident of the

Phil i ppine Commonwealth, he as ked MacArthur if he would come
to Manila as mili t ary advisor.

Pr sid&nt Roosevelt gave his

consent and MacArthur left f or th
build an army. 1
MacArthur

Philip ines in 193.5 to

d a bard j ob abe d of him .

There was

critic1 m, but he aingle-mindealy went on with hi s work .
One section of the press charged that Pre ident Quezon was

asking MacArthur to he lp him in setting up a dictatorship .. 2
The Filipinos called him uthe Napoleon of Luzon."

His s t y e

and manner of addreaaing hi s soldier$ reminded one of

Napoleon .
S.$

The people of the Philippines referred to this

"MacArthur ian -tyle ~· n3

&mer l MacArthur felt that there was a race against

" Irrancis "T~evelyan Miller, ~o~gla~ M!~thut, FighteF
for fieedom, ( Phi lad lpbiai John c, Win,a ton Company, 1945),
P• 139 .
2
CatJ.oi'J P, Romulo, ! Sav-1 the f;dl , ~ the fhi\4PPipe,§,
(New York: ,Doubleday, Doran, and Company , Inc ., 1943); p . 42.

3~~l~t~'u §.~t-YJtign .!!! '-the !!1..&-~§st)

He•ring•

befot:~

the Committee on- Al:tued Services and _the Committee on Foreign
Re lations, United States Senate, 82nd Congreaa, First Sesaio·n,
(Wa hington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 223 ,

17
time to build an army .

He stated that the United S·tates had

to build strong defenses on American islands in the Pacific
as eoo11 as possible .

There was

SODle

opposition in the

United States and MacArthur pleaded:
The Philippine Army repre ents one of the
most heroic efforts a liberated people has
ever made to maintain independence ·and
national. ntegrity . It thre t n no one.
It 1 s ol · purpose is to preserve its
country'a pe ce, it democratic principles
and ita Chr:tltian faith. It deserve$ the
complete aupport of public opinion in the
Unf.ted States · nd wherever freedom is the

guiding &pirit of men•

cArthur said that h

nwa ·

livee.4

charged in high quartert w:tth

being a warmonger and threatening the peace of the Far

East . "5

General MacArthur retired from the United States Army
on Decembet: 31 , 1937, with the highest praise of President
Roosevelt.

He, with his family, took up permanent residence

in Manila where he followed .the world situation with intense
~ ...

·---··-·

:tntere t , 6
President Roo evelt had al o been

l~atching

the world

4nouglas 'MacArthur, ~~i~~'f@nC~J , {New York: McGraw~
Hill Book Company, c . 1964), p . 145.

5!h14·
" Het:oes-·Me.cArthur , ' Time, 83 : 24 , April 10 , 1964.

18

s ituation.

On July 26 , 1941, he sent a message to MacArthur

ordering that the Philippin Army be mobi lized under his
command.

He was called back into active servic

to command

all armed forces of the Far Ea t . 7 MacArthur accep
~9 the
.
~

--·-·~

challenge:
I am glad to be able to serve my country
at this crucial time . This ction of the
American Goverum<:mt in establ is bing this
net\' command can only mean that it intends

to maint ain at any co
in the Far East . B

t

its fu ll ri ghts

The Pre ident authorized !<1aeArt:hur to spend $10,000,000

for initial expen e of mobilization and preparation .
as though a rQprieve had come to a death sentence .

It was
There

might still be time to build a defense agains t sudden
Japanese invaaion . 9

Carlo

Romulo stated:

I t was evident that America was planning
to show
firm hand to Japan . MacArthur's
appointment a s Co1Dlll4nder .. 1n... Chief of the
United States Armed Force s in the Far East
pointed to this . The evacuation of
Amet:ican women, t he application of the
arm embargo , ana the c ssation of the

s

" . 71razier Hunt ,
cArthur ~ t he
Ag§tinst Japan ,
(New York: Cbarle$ Scribner ' s and S~ns, 1944), p . 2.
8clark Lee and Richard· lien 'hel , p_pugl~.! MacArt~'ulr •

First Edition ; ( ew York:

l~nry

p . 135 .
9 Hunt ,

n.

cit • , p • 3 •

Holt and Company , c . 1952),

19

sale of oil to Japan had been the first
indica t ion • As a final blow he United
States froze Japane e credit. 10
The Philippine Commonwealth t d a plan ., developed by
MacArthur, which contemplated a defense of the entire island
area, but this was scheduled to go into effect in 1946 when
the Philippines ecqu1red their independence.ll
The general's prewar a sessment of the combat value
of the Philippine Army was far higher tha·n

~1as

warranted, and

hi s mobilization and trainin ' schedule t-:'aS based on tbe
belief that hostilities would not begin until pril of
1942. 12 1~ said that by this time he would
ve a trained
army of about 200,000 men, a powerful airforce of 256
bombers , a

wel l a

195 pursuit planes.

He fe l t that his

great strength would assure the defensibility not only of
the Philippineo, but the entire Southeast Pacific area . l 3
By December 7, 1941, MacAr thur had about 130 ,000 men
in uniform , but nearly 100,000 of them were poorly equipped
with only a few months training in clo eporder dri ll .

nr· omulo

0

The

.9.2· ill.· , p . 3 .

11 Hanson ·w. Baldwin, qrga§ M:i,S£§kes 9! the.. ttlar, (New
1
York : Harpe:r and Brothers , . l 49) , p . 67.

J,l>i9~.~ , p i 68 .

12

13John Toland, M ~ot in Shame, (New Yor k: Random
House , Inc ., c . 1961) , p. 26.
'

20
men were willing and enthusiastic, but they could do little
more than sal ute in the correct manner.
even fired their old rifles.

Most of them hadn't

The airforce was in the worst

shape; there were 277 planes, of which 35 were flying
fortresses.
combat craft .

There were only 107 P.. 40's which were modern
Nevertheless, MacArthur refused to be

panicked , even though strange aircraft had been si ghted four
nights in a row . l4
The general was compelled to await a move by the
Japanese, as he stated:
My orders from Washington were not to
initiate hostilities against the Japane se
under any circumstances . The first overt
move in the Phi lippines must come from the
enemy . There was apparently some hope
that the somewhat indeterminate international poSition of the Commonwealth
might: eliminate it from attack . This
possibility had support not only from
Quezon~ but from the American Chief of
Staff, l5
Therefore, MacArthur felt that he had to wait before putting
plan "Rainbow Five'' into operation .

This plan provided for

offensive air operations in order to further the strate gic

-

Ilitbid.
lSMacArthur, ~ · cit ., p . 113 .
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defensive . 16
MacArthur

tateo:

••• Whatever might come, we were as
ready as we poss ibly could be in our

inadequate defenses; on the night of
December 7, every disposition had been
made, every man, gun , and plane was on
the alert,l7
General MacArthur was unaware of the two minor raids
on the islands at Mindanao and Aparri.

He was pos itive that

the Philippines would soon be

though many Filipino

attaal~ed,

authorities hoped that the Japanese

l~uld

consider them an

i11dependet1t nati on and &.pare them.

The general knew that if

he made a wrong move now , his whole plan of local sel f defense might collaps e .

ln the back $f his mind he also

remembered General Marshall's orders s uu: hos tilities cannot

be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the
fi rs t over t act. ul8

'" "16Baldwin, .212.• ,p!t . , p . 67.
1 7M.acArt11.ur, .22• c& t . , p . 59 .
18Toland • .21!• cit . , p . 59 .

CHAF'l'ER IV
MACARTHUR: THE DEFENDER OF THE PHILIPPINES

MacArthur had ordered

11 flying fortresses around

Manila to be flown to Davao Field on Mindanao f or safety from
surprise attack .

Only about half of them

gone by

r~d

December 7, 1941, because room had to be left at the Mindanao
base for more B·l7s 'tqhich were expected from Hawaii .
irfields war

t o b bombed a

Formo s~m

a counter•att ck as soon as

\Japan ei t her made or declared war , l
(

Tl;l.e report came tba t Luzon had been bombed; now there

was no question about an .. over t act . " Far Eastern Air
Commander Brereton phoned Ma::J.or General Richard I<. . Sutherla11d ~
!i

MacArthur's Chief of Staff, about the attacks .

Brereton said

that "if Clark field is attacked, we won't be able to operate
it. u He begged for permission to bOll\b Formosa, and it w

..____ -

s

·-

fully authorized too late to hit Takao Harbor as planned .
While Brereton 's staff planned new missions, the army

bombe~s

$ked permission to return to Clark Field . 2

lsamuel Eliot Morison, The l!:9. Oc§a!l War, (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, c . 1963), p . 80,
2Jo1m Toland, But Not !!! Shame, (New York: Rand
House, Inc ., c. 1961) a p . 61 .
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There were sixteen flying fortresses at Clark Field
lined up ready to fight.

The thr e hangars were being

camouflaged or repa1red. 3 The Japanese pilots were surpri ed
that almost te11 hours afte:t· Pearl Harbor, every plane based

at Clark wa a "sitting target."

In one stroke the Japanese

knocked out the Far East Ait Fo~ee at Clark Field.4
The attack wa
Gener~l

over almost as soon as it began .

Carlo Romulo described what happened:
Our planes had b en caught lined up on
the field in broad daylight . lt is true
that they ba.d be n ordered to t ke off
and remain cir cling in the air ~ They
stayed up all morning until noon . Then
the fl.yer l came down in perfect echelons
and were lined up and waiting on the
field when the Japane$e ripped down out
of tl~ skies with their great bombers • • • 5

Of the planes p rk d on the runwsy,
flying fortresses lvere d stroyed .

11 but three

In one r aid the Japa·nese

had eliminated in half a day two of America ' s defenses in
Southeas t Asia: the Pacific Fleet and MacArthur 's air force .
America had le rned too late what the le sons of war b1
' 31h.!9.., P• 27.
4 Ioid . ~ p . 64 .

s·c arlos P. Romulo, ! . ~ ·J:!!! ~alt ,.2! the Phil:tnet.nes,

(New Y'lrk: DDubleday, Doran-~' aptJ. Company~, 1943), p. 23 .
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Europe had

taught-~that

a

heavy bomber force without adequate

protection, air warning and anti-aircraft guns 1 helpless
and useleas . 6

If permission had been granted to launch an attack on
Formosa in time 11 no great results could have been expected,
for our strength

~;as

too small and

inexperienced~

little accurate information concerning targets.

and we had
On the

other hand, it would have been far better to utilize our
bombers in an offensive mission than to allow them to be

caught as they were.7
A

Field.

controversy developed over the incident a.t Clark
Several stories were in conflict .

MacArthur had

one story, General Brereton bad another, and General
Sutherland had

till another.

had to be consulted . s

Several different accounts

MacArthur never made a comprehensive

explanation of this inoident ; but he s tated that General
Brereton had suggested to General Sutherland an attack
againat Formosa before the Clark Field attack on the morning

· · · 6i'oia~d,.. .sm- .21£..,
7Hanson

w.

P· 10.

-

-

-

Baldwin , ..................
Great~ ...M~---,;.;,.
stakes
of the War, (New
;;:;,~;.
York: Harper and Brothers, c . 1.949 , p. 70 .
8Artb\l_t: Si}'b lesinger JJ:.., wrhe Mysteries of B,taan,"
111e Report r, 10:37, February 2 , 1954 .
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of December 8 . 9 MacArthur also stated:
• • • I know nothing of any interview td th
Sutherland, and Brereton never at any time
recommended or suggested an attack on
Formosa to me . My first knowledge of it
was in a newspaper d1 patch months later.
Such a suggestion to the Chief of Staff
mu t have been of a most nebulou and
superficial c racter, as there was no
record of it at headquarters. The proposal, if intended seriously, should cerp
tainly have been made to me in per on. t~
has never spoken of th matter to me either
before or after the Clark Field attack •••
As a matter of fact, an attack on Formosa,
with its heavy air ~oncentrations, would
have been suicidal . 0
General Brereton stated that the planes were on the
ground because of the long
office to authoriz

ix hour delay taken by MacArthur 's

n attack on Formosa . 11

General George C. Kenney ; Commander of MacArthur 's air
force in Au tralia, stated:
Brereton • _ a.ecc!>\.mt of the vents of
December 8# 1941 , show$ a state of confusion and indeeision tha·t does not ound
as though MacArthur had anything to do
with the r~ndling of the air force that
day , BTereton's contact with MacArthur 's
Headquarters was General Richard K.
Sutherland, the Chief of Staff, who
-

'9l)ougla. 'MacArthur , .Reini§CinQ.e§~ (New York:

Hill Book Company, c. 1964), p . 120.
10 l'bid .
~

llschlesinger , .2.1?.• qi£ ., p. 38 ,

cGraw-
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received recommendations for the use of
the air force, and who often rendered
decisions in the name of General
MacArthur . l2
There are other s who seem to share General Kenney's
idea of the Clark Field incident.

Samuel Eliot Morison, in

trying to explain why Brereton, Sutherland, and MacArthur
blamed one another, said that "the real trouble was bad
blood between Sutherland and Brereton, of which, unfortunately MacArthur seems to have been ignorant . "13
Baldwin, in his book Great Mis tal<es .2£ £h!l

ru,

Hanson
suggests

that General Sutherland may have taken it upon himself to
refuse permission for the Formosa raid, though, at the
same time, he blamed Brereton . 14

General MacArthur, who

had an extreme loyalty to his staff, defended General
Brereton:
A number of statements have been made
criticizing General Brereton, the impli~
cation being that through neglect or
faulty judgment he failed to take proper
security measures , resulting in the
destruction of part of hi s air force on
the ground • • • • Such statements do an
12George C. Kenney, The MacArthur I l<now , (Ne\v York:
Due l l, Sloan, and Pearce, c.-1951), p . 83.- ·~ .
l3samuel Eliot Morison , Strategy .!.!!! Compromise,
tittle, Brown, at!d Company, c . 1958), p. 81.

( Boston~

14 Baldwin ,

.Q.E. ·

ill•, P· 71.
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injustice to this officer. His fighters
were in the air to protect Clarl( Field ,
but \,rere outnumbered and failed to intercept the enemy • • • • 15
MacArthur had 11,500 miles of Philippine coastline to

He could not have his limited troops everywhere at

defend.

once and was compelled to await a Japanese i nvasion .

This
..,___

invasion finally came on the lOth and 27th of December, 1941 .
They landed in force on the east coas t of Luzon.

All in all ,

they moved more than 200,000 men against MacArthur's
forces. 16

In northwestern Luzon, MacArthur's forces were out numbered , incompletely equipped, lacking air support; and
were only recently mobilized and organized into regimental
greups .

MacArthur felt that this left him no other alter-

native but to fight a delaying act i on .

'rni s was later
I

comp l icated by other landings in Luzon. 1 7
Tension began to mount in the Philippines as another .
landing was confirmed on the southern coast of Luzon .

--

15MacArthur, 'l oc . cit .
16Franl( Kelley and Cornelius Ryan , .MacArthur , ~ of
Action, (New York : Dl:\'nbleday and Company, In..:- ., 1950) , p . 6 .

17George C. Marshall , H. H. Arnold, and Ernest J .
K.i ng, The tvar Re.pQrt~ -..Q£.: · ( Philadelphia and New Yor ~: J.
Lippincott Company, c . 1947) , p . 76 .

B.
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MacArthur guessed thB.t. all these landings were minor

probings ;

therefore~

he held back, waiting for the main

l anding which was bound to come .

He s tated tha t "the bas ic

principle of handling troops was to hold them intact until
the enemy has committed itself in force . " 18

MacArthur al so

s tated:

I kept a close watch on the l ow, sloping
beach s of Lingayen Gulf, \oJh..ere I had

stationed the 11th nd 21st Divisions of
the Philippi
Army at be ch defens s .
In the deceptive quiet of the gray dawn
of Decet her 22nd. the srea.t enemy blow
fell t l as t: . A huge invasion f orce
-ntered Lingayen Gulf • .• •The troops

\

conveyed were • • • a tota l strength of
approximately 80,000 c ombat troop • This
was about twice my own strength on
Luzon . • • . 19
Though

cArthur and other member

of his s taff have

tated that their force s were outnumbered by the Ja.pane s e ,
Loui

Morton in hi

book

f~e

all

~ ~ ~ 1}2E!n~ s

tha t the defense forces on Luzon actual l y outnumbered
invading Japanese by

bout two to one . ZO

s t a te s
the ~

MacArthur has

\
(

beau known in the past t o have over e.stimated the s ize of ')
"TB'Tol n · ~ .2.2 ·

£1...!· ,

•

104 .

19MacArthur, EE• cit . , pp . 123 ~ 124 .
20Loui Morton ThE! !!!.! £! ,the ].'h~.lJ.P..attes,
(\-Jas hington D. C. : Department of the Army, 1953) , p . 162 .
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an invading force.
MacArthur, realizing that this for ce was t he main
division, rushed tanks to the north .

He al s o ordered

General Brereton to collect every bo

er in the area for a

morning strike at Lingayen.

Reach defenders were also

warned to expect the gt ·ea t invasion.
could do very

a felv

l ittl~

Brere ton 's air force

due t o the fact th

planes remaining .

t

there were only

Deapi to heavy casual ties, the

Japane$e pushed ashore and moved t o ard the north t o meet
the f orce which had landed i n northern Luzon and were moving

south do~m t he co st . 21
l\'hen the Japane e opened hostilitie s , there wa s a
convoy of seven ships, escorted by the Cruiser

!~nS!~~l~

moving toward Manila carrying
needed planes, ammuni

ordered back to

~l on 1

~waii,

and suppU.es .

The convoy was
~

ment of t:he Philipp :lne •
,,

---.-· ·-..

___ ...........,....-.------·'~---_...... ...~......

MacArthu

_

which was , in eff et , the abandon.... --.__..,..-....-...,...,...._..__ -

...

Ge era ! Marshall hated to tell

that it had to turn back when it was needed so

badly in the

hilippines.

A meeting of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff decided to send the convoy to Bri sbane in

Australia, and then efforts would be tt'.ade to t ake it

Manila. .

cArthur coul

011.

to

see no ·rea en why this could not

21Toland:· .22• cit . , pp . 112-113 .
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be done with rea sonable nava l and air protection, and he
discussed the matter with Admiral Hart.2 2
The conference that MacArthur had with Admiral
was not a happy one.
ever

These

l~o

!~rt

men had been in conflict

ince MacArthur took command of the United States Army

forces :i.n the Far East the previou$ July .

Their differences

worsened with the disa trous eventa of the first week in
December of 1941.

Hart disapproved of MacArthur's plan to

bring the convoy to Manil

by s tating that the Japanese

would guess what they were doing and throw up a blockade
around the Philippines before the aonvoy could leave
Brisba.ne . 23
MacArthur finally abandoned his
at the beaches an

considered

plan formulated by his

predecessors--War Plan Orange III,
-

slow withdrawal to

tl~

-- ---

trategy of holding

This plan called for a

·-~-·-.

Bataan Peninsula where a last-ditch

defensive could be fought until the Navy could send reinforcements if po sibl •

MacArthur had given up this earlier

plan for he felt "it was

defeatist move that might well

-

'Z'X:Morton , .21?.· cit . , pp. 146-147.
23toland, ~ · cit . , p . 103 .
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lose him t:he suppor t of the Filipinoa .. " 24
The chief reason for the order to wit draw was the

failure of the troops to hold the enemy .

Up until this time ,

MacArthur had had the grea t est confi e nce

n the fight ng

qualities of the reservists of the Philippine Army .

~sent

word to Washington tha t he would remove his force under

cover of darkness.25
The withdrawal could easily
Bay

~a s

v

been crippled .

Manila

full of various types of craft shuttling men,

munitions, and food to Corregidor and B

t

an .

Highway three,

leading from Man1 la, was jammed with everything from trucks
to ox carts.

One bomb in the right spot c uld have destroyed

the whole plan, but the Japanese flew over the evacuation
and d:t.d not bomb it . 26

Maci-tt"thur stated:

The hazardous timing of this mov ment was
it moat notable feature; on
lip in the
co-ordinated maneuver, and the motor
colllmns f rolll southern Luzon o ld have
b en cut off and cornered in Manila . The
success of this opera ti n nabled the
assembly and reor ganizat ion on Bataan of
the bulle f my orce , an madE! po s5.ble.
the sub equent defense of the penins ula . 27

_.._. . . ,. ___ -z
}J~id .' p .

134.

25Mor ton , Be • cit . ,

• l 3.

26 ola d , ~ · c.it ., p. 146 .
2 71-facAr t hur, QE.·

ill· ,

p. 153 .
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The biggest problem was food.

There were 3,000 tons

of canned meat and fish already stored on Bataan, and the
rest was on its way by water, rail, and highway.

The

question was how long the road to Bataan could be kept
open.28

In order to give time to prepare defenses on Bataan
and to permit an orderly withdrawal of men and supplies,
Wainwright was to hold back the Japanese along five lines.29
The object was to hold only long enough to force the enemy
to prepare for an organized attack, delaying them long
enough to reaeh Bataan intact.

But it was soon evident that

Wainwright, with his poorly trained and equipped troops,
could not hold out till January 8, as planned; he was worried
about holding out til the first.JO
In Manila everything was chaotic.

Military installa•

tions were in a state of confusion as personnel were hastily
loaded into trucks, cars, and busees.

Earlier that after-

noon, orders had been given to

to Bataan Peninsula.

ret~eat

The explanation now was that Manila had been declared an
28toland • .1m.. cit. , p. 146.
29MOrton, ~· ~., p. 165.
30to land • loc.

.£!!.

...
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open city to save it from greater bombing. 31

MacArthur

s tated:
Manila, because of the previous evacuation
of our force s, no longer had any practical
mi litary v lue. The entrance to Manila
Bay was completely covered by Corregidor
and Bataan ; as long as we held them, its
u se would be denied t 1e enemy . He mi~ht
have the bottle, but I had the cork.3
\.vhen the govern.ment and the army had left the city,

there was a feeling of f oreboding and terror.

The exodus

f:t·om the city, which had cea ed a fter tbe f irs t war scare,

began all over a gai 1. 33
The Japanese had complete ly misunderstood the mass
migration .
certain

They believed that t hi s w

eleu~nt

a frantic f l ight of

of the Philippine Army.

The Japanese felt

that if they concentrated on the capital, the campai gn would
be over once it wa s

t

ken .

They thought that MacArthur

could probably hold on Bataan a few .weeks.,

o they ignored

the migration disappe ring i nto the Bat aan jungles ana

concentrated on Manila . 34

--

3lib1d.

P~ 138 ,

32MacA thur, o • cit ., p . ' l.53.

33Morton , o • £4~ . , p . 234 .
34roland, ~ · Qit ; , pp . 156·157 .
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The retreat to Bataan had been carried out safely
under harrowing conditions .

Wainwright had lost 12,000

men and had had many de ertions in his delaying fight .
MacAlrthur now had 15,000 Americans and 65,000 Filipinos in

Bataan .

Although 10,000 were professional soldiers , the

remainder was a group of untrained men • This \vas the force
which was to hold so long .
mountains and jungle

Their greatest asset was the

of the rugged Bataan terrain . 35

Radio Tokyo ackn&wledged the receipt of MacArthur ' s
"open city" declaration, but the Japanese in the Philippines

were either unaware of it or ignored it .

They had flown

over the mas s evacuation and were bombing Manila , on
December 27 , 1941, as though the major force was located
there . 36
During the final days on Bataan ; MacArthur and

President Quezon sent many mes sages to Washington begging
for help that never came , help which could not have come
except for a trickle of supplies by submarine .

T\ey were

sent only encou'ragement, when they really needed b\illets,
men, food, and medicine . 37

234 .
113 .

34

MacArthur was up et by what he referred to as
.. defeatism," and wired General Marshall that "if the Pacific
is to be saved it will h ve to be saved here and now . u

He

begged officials in Washington to recon ider their strategy
because if the Filipinos discovered they had been abandoned
by the United States, everything would collapse .

general

The

aid that if the Philippines could be saved, it

would justify " the diversion here of tb.e entire output of
by the United States . 38

air and other resources"

Efforts to tran$mit any supplies to Corregidor had
failed because of

4

rigid enemy bloet<ade .

At least fifteen

blockade runners gere sunk or captured by the enemy while
attempting to get supplies through to Bataan .

Several over ...

age destroy rs were also fitted as blockade r unners, but
none of these succeeded in reaching the Philippines prior
to the fall of Corregidor . J9

Corregidor was

n island that aat in the mouth of

Manila Bay, easily visible from Manila on a clear day .
holder of Corregido:: controlled Manila Bay.
les

The

The island wa

than two and one half miles from Bat:aan. which was to
38!oland~ .22• c;f.t .

t

PP• 103-104.

39Mar hall, .22• _ill., p. 78.
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become the main battlefield on the Philippines .

The rock,

or Corregidor, was de igned perfectly for defense, for here
in rock and l4'ell hidden were the fort's big guns ,

On the

island there was a hump of solid rock; this was called
t-ia.lint:a Hill,

In the hill was bored a gre·

t

tunnel in which

10,000 men could live without fear of bombing .

wa

to be MacArthur • headquarters .

This tunnel

The general and his

family lived in a small cottage half a mile beyond the
eastern mouth of the tunnel.40
MacArthur made a trip out to speak to the general
officers of tvainwright and Parker in ox-der to whip up the
spirits of the tired defenders . 41

The general carried an

Help ie on the way from the United States ,
Thousands of t roops and undreds of planes
are being dispatched . • , ,No further
retreat is po ible . We have mor.e troops
in Bataan than the Japane$e have thrown
against u$) our supplie . are ample; a
determined defense will defeat the enemy ' s
attack. , • •1 call upon every soldier in
Bataan to fight in his a&s igned pos ition,
resisting enemy attack. 'thi$ is the only
road to salvation. If we fight , we will 42
win , if we retreat , we will be destroyed ,

~OT~land~ i!• oit . , pp . 103·104 .
41

I!?i,,, P• 179 .

42 Ibie •

............... .
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Many of the American noncoms openly jeered at the general's
optimism and others $uffered di sappointment later on .

The

great majority of the Filipinos took these words as hope and
inspiration . 43

On the whole, the general was not a great

inspiration to many men during this time, because he rarely
vi ited Bataan , 44
On January 22, General Sutberland returned to

Corregidor from Bataan de scribing the situation

s so alarm-

ing that an immediate l-1ithdrawal waa necessary .

MacArthur

agreed, and, on January 23 , ordered a general retreat to the
..

last line .

Thi was a line which

'"'

cArthur s id was well

prepar ed ., 45
When this line wa

reached-. General MacArthur ordered

the retre ting men to att ck

nd rea t ore t heir liues.

They

were now IDQ.nning the Abucay Line which exten ed from Pilac

to Boyac .

Thi& line

~a

Stronger though the men were weak ,

hungry, and tired aft r th

long retreat .

The retreat had

ended and the Japanese, thinking it was about over, attacked
Mac-Arthur ' s flanks from the China Se

Zi31bid., p

side .

Th:t was almost

180.

44Baldwf.n; £!E. • cit. , pp . 63 ... 64 .
4 '»ob Con .idine ~ .~ep~r~t po':!.!l§~ MacArthur . (Greenwich,
Connecticut: Fawcett Publication · , Inc . , c . 19 4) , p . 186 .
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a fatal move on the part of the Japane et for they landed on
five polnts of land on the west cQast .

No troops could be

tJpared from MacArthur's front line to face them , but eomewhere the needed men w re formed
of a company

there~

f~om

a group here or part

These makeshift forces held the

Japanese on the se points, preventing them from coming in the
front lines, 46

rear of the general'

The general's situation was despera te.

The futility

of the meager efforts Washington was making was accented by
70 tons of mmunition brought in by the

l~~nt .

Greater

amounts of supplies were nee.ded and MacA;'thur continued to
tvarn W abington that it was a fatal mi s take to continue
their present policy.
Japanese line of

He believed that the 2,000 mile

communica tion~

hould be attacked instead

of concentrating on the building up Qf force$ in Australia ,

Th

general said that there was one way to defeat Japan:

"seek combat, not avoid it."'47
Many of the men on Corregidor held en to their hope

to the last d y.

They did not know or believe that only a

little while after

eeember 8, 1941, the decision had been

~UClark Lee, Th~J! 9R-~lll r..tJ.£1fis;; (Ne't'l York: The
Viking E'ress~ l943l~ pp .. 192-193 .

47Tol nd:~ .!?.2. •

sJS ·,

p . 205 ,
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made in Wa hington that the Philippine

could not be rein•

forced, and that MacArthur and his men would have to do the
b

t with what

they had , 48

Brigadier General Dwight D, Ei
four years as MaeArtiur•s

enhawe~,

enior military as

who had

pent

stant, was

called upon to give an opinion by General Marshall.
Ei .·enhower, after pondering the que t:ton,

reali~ed

that

reinforcements could only be sent to the Philippines when
the Navy was rehabilitated .

The only · olution , thought

Eisenhower• was to .. set up Au ·tralia as a ba e
operation • '' 49

fo~

offensive

It t<1ould have been hard for men s uffering on

Bataan to accept this decision . 50

cAtthur describes the

situation:
· Our ttoop were 11ow approaching exbaus tion .
The guerrilla movement was going well, but
on Bataan and Corregidor the clouds were
gro~1ing darker.
My he :t~t aehed as I saw
,my man lowly wasting away . Their ·clothes
buns on them like tatt red rag • Their
bar$ feet stuel( out :tn s:l.l$nt protes,t .
Their long bedraggled hair framed gaunt
bloodless f~ces . 5l
liS Lee ,

'
a.

2 ;1. ~ • , p • 240 •

49Toland , ~ · e~t ., P• 107.
50tee, .21?.•

ft.!i. ,

p . 193 •

5 1MaeArthur, .22• cit,, p . 1359
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President Quezon became increa ingly anxious about the
situation and sent the following me . aage to MacArthur who
forwarded it to Washington :
This war is ·no t of our making • • • we
decided tc fight by your ide and l~ve
done the best we could and we are till

doing as m.uch as could be e~peated from
us under the circu ·tance • But how long
are we going to be left lon ? Has it
already been decided i n Washingtm1 that
the Philippine front iS of no importance
a far a th fitlal result of the war is
concerned nd tha.t, therefore~ no help
c n be ex ected ·· re in tl~ immediate
future; or t le st before the powe:rr of
resi'ltanee i B xhausted? ·• . • .lt seems
that W hington does not fully realize
ours· tu titn1 nor · the feeling which the
apparent neglect to our , afety and wel·
fare have eng ndered i~ the hear t$ of
the people her . • • • •

Quezon became more
efforts were being

nd more

2

i~~atient

a

no real

de to · enforce the Philippine •

H$

went to MacArthur propos i ng that he a k resident Roosevel t
to grant immediate independence to the Philippines .

Then

the islands v1ould be neutralized and would no longer be a
battleground .

Gen ral MacArthur fon1arded thi& message to

Washington along with a report of his own .
written a bitter mes.s age &aying that
that we are neat:ly

done,~·

11

uezon had

thet"e was no denyb1g

and also added that the Filipino

40
attitude was one of "almost violent resentment agains t the
United State . u53

President Rooseve l t sent a per onal me sage to Quezon
which repudiated the idea ·of independence and declared that
the United States Government would never agree to this type
of

The Pre ident expressed his sympathy for the

oluticn .

Philippine people and pledged .American upport no matt er
what happened t o the present force.

the United States

"~

Roosevel t added that

•• shall not re.lax our efforts until

the fore s now mat"Shalling out ide the Philippine Islands

return to the Philippine . and drive the la$t ·remnant of
the invaders from your soil, u.54

General

l~cArthur

Preeident Roosevel t in

I

received the following message from
anst~er

t o his a king for instr uctions:

therefo~e

give you thi mos t difficult
ion in ful l under .tanding of the
deepel:'a.te situation to which you may be
shortly reduced • • • • Ma e your re istance
a effective • • • and as prolon ed a
humanly po ible • • • • You ; yourself,

mi

however;

tn\tSt

determi e

a~§ ion

to be taken

in view of circumstances .
The geneX'al, reading between the lines,

·-s3Toland, .9.2· .ill· , PP . 213 .. 214 .
54Mo_rtont SE.• 9.&~·, PP• 354 ...3__55 .
5.5

Kelley . £2' Sj!. , P• 116 .

now

knew that
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the Philippines were to be used a s a symbol of resis tance to

He replied to Roosevelt:

the last .

I have not the slightest intention in the
world of surrendering cr capitulating the
Filipino force of my command . I intend
to fight to de truetion on Bataan and
then do the sam

on Col'regidor . 56

Hanson Baldwin, in his book Great Mistal<:es of t he

m,

stated that i t t-1as ha;rd to u1tderstan d how MacArthur could

radio Wa$hington givi g tacit approval of Pre ident Quezon 's
me saga te Pre ident Ro0sevelt only "twenty f our days after
promis ing his men that thou and

of r einforcement and

hundreds , of plane$ ~1ere on th~ way. n57

other hand, had explained that

11

eArthur , on the

uch c t:ion was necessary

t o concentrate immedi te attention or it would be too

late . " 58

Thera were bitt er rumors of a Wa shington ell out on
Corregidor .

Some of the officers r emembered that Generals

Mar$

~mcArthur we~e , not

11 and

because Marshall s till blam d

on good personal terms
cArthur f or not making him

a general when the latter wa Chief of

""SiiQcAt- thur ) .22.
51 Baldwin,

e:l. t . • p , 139 •

• cit, .,, p . 75 .

58M.ac.AJ: thur , IS~ · cit .

Staff ~

It was
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feared that Roosevelt and Marshall would let MacArthur rot
in the Philipp:f.nes . 59
The men on Bataan at fir t be lieved the optimistic
reports from MacArthur's Headquarter$ , but they later despaired .

It was here that the "Dugout Doug" stories s tarted .

Front line troopers were griping about those on Corre gidor
who lived in Comfort . 60
MacArth1r had spent most of his time on Corregidor
and he might not have completely realized the great shortage
of food on the fighting front .

Later, when Wainwright t ook

command, he found the men on Corregidor better fed than
those on Bataan.61
Hanson Baldwin. stated that the "Dugout Doug" stories
which started on Corregidor, were extremely unfair .
cast unwarranted reflections upon
courage, which was outstanding .

~~cArthur's

They

personal

In two world wars he had

always demons trated a calm and exemplary bravery . 6 2
During the latter part of February of 194l,, General
59Toland, £2• cit . , p. 210 .
oibid . , p, 291.
61schlesinger , ~ · £!! . , p. 38 .
62Baldwin, ££·cit . , p. 73.
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MacArthur was ordered to Austr li • The gene:ral thought
that an abrupt dep r ture might result in "collapse in the

Philippine area, "
the

11

nd he asked tG delay hi . departure unti l

psycholog:lcal time,"63

MacArthur added~

• • • The e people ar

depending upon me

now. • , and any i dea that might d$ve lop
in their mind that I wa being withdrawn
for any other purpo e than to bring them

immediate relief ceuld not be explain d. • •64

General Marshall granted MacAr hur this delay in departure.
ix days later on lt"ebruary 24 .65

The "psycho l ogical t:· · " came

o evelt knew that General MacArthu1:'
I

'

I

withdr awal would have important reactions, and, at a news
conference hel d on March 17, 1942, made the fol lmqi ng
s t atement:

• , • There

it~J

going to be Axis pro ...

g nda that will . ppea~ this fternoon
on theilt hort w ·v • and tomorrow
. rn:tng, ab . ut t,low

th~
a ab-~ndo-.;unent
\

of

the Philippine · is nothing more than
another Van ook .\ring to get o~t of
Java, et eetera .
nd of cour e we kpow
wha t they will ay. On the other ide
of the picture; put it thi way, he will
be more useful in oupr .. e command of th~
whol . Sot1thwest Pacific than :tf he tayed
j

I

. o!Itforton , .2B.• ci_t . , p . 357 .
64~b~d~, p . 358 .

65lki&.·
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on Bataan Peninsula, where of course the
fighting is going on. • • • 66
The War Department made Jonathan Wainwright Commander•
in•Chief of all forces in the Philippines, promoting him to
lieutenant general in March of 1942.

The problem which

Wainwright had to face immediately was the lack of food . 67
It wa
in force.68
it was over.
dered .

April 1, 1942, that the Japanese att eked

The Bataan force held out for eight days and then
It t-1as not long until Correg:ldor also surren-

MacArthur wrote of Corregidor:

Corregidor needs no comment from me . It
h&s sounded its own story at the mouth
of its guns . lt has scrolled its own
epitaph on enemy tablets. But through
the bloody haze of its last reverberating
shot, I shall always seem to see a vision
of grim, gaunt, ghastly men; still
unafraid.69
To determine the reasons why Bataan fell, MacArthur's
whole Philippine record has to

~e

taken into consideration .

(;6From Franklin D. Roosevelt News Conference , March 17,
1942, in Samuel I . Rosenman (Ed .) , ~he Pub~ic Pape:ra!!
Franklin R· Roosevelt, (New York: Harper and Brother s , 1942),
vol., P• 110 .
·
67Jonathan M. Wain~Tight, General Wainwright's Story,
(New York:. Doubleday and Gompany, tnc . , 1946), p . 67 .
68J,ee, !£• cit., p. 195 .
69}facArthur,

12£. £.!!·•
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The general was over-optimistic in thinking that the i lands
In the early months of 1941 , MacArthur

were :impregnable .

had stated that the Japane e had overspent them elve
felt that there was uo rea on to fear

and

~

he Ja anese until

April of 1942 . 70
Bataan al o fell beeause of the Ja anase

trength and

the laclc of reinforcement f or MacArthur 1 a fore • These
force s were ill due to a

hortage of food and supplie • 71

The general dem nded suppli·s, but
these could not be
Fires ide · Chat to

t

ent.

t

re were rea on

·hy

Pre id nt Roos v lt , in his

e people of

Americ~ ort

•ebruary 23 ,

19 42 ~

$tated that:

It is

t~1t

complete

control of the air by

ncirclem nt: , l-1it
J

panese land .. ba · ed

a ircra ft, •lhich
• pr eve te u from
aendin• eJub tantia.l rei fQrce
ts of men

and material t o the ga llant def nders &f
the Philippines . • • , 72
Loodng back on th

sit ation, General Carlo

1? . Romulo

10Artl1u~-Schle$f.nge-r Jr . ~ · "The Mysteries of Bataan,"
T,.h~ ~Rqrte~, 10:37, Febt·uary 2, 1954 .

-

71Ibid., p . 36.

72From Franklin Roo .evelt' Fire ide Ohat, .February 23 ,
1942 , in Samuel I . Rosenman (eeL ) , Tb~ b~l!'r Papt;ra !!
Jf.£ankl~:q Q• .!\2,osevelt, New Yorlo Harpet: and Brother , 1942
va l . , P.• 110 .
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states:

In our trap on the Rock we could not know
of the tremendou off n 1ve America ~a
concentrating in Europe, I rshall and
Ei enhower needed all-out upport over
them. Enemy submarine wer concentra t ng
on the floor of the Atlantic . America 's
fleet had een de~troyed at Pearl
rbor .
Wa hington wa desperately buildin up
Amex-iea'tf defenses nd Gffensive where
th y were needed most . America could not
spread it~ offensive aero a two oceans .
The Pacific problem would have to wait .73
There wa

also much fr . ction which gre't-1 during the

Bataan fighting an

the

iege of Corregi or betwee·n the

br nches of the service as well a$ old per onal jealou ies . 74
All of these things played an imp rtant part in the battle

and f 11 of the_ Philippines .

73ca:rlos l? .
mulo , 1 ~§.l!s~s! H~I<h J~~Q§.f. , (New Yorlo
Alfred A. l<nopf, 19 3), p . 11 .
74Baldwin, £2 ~ s!! ·, p . 72.

CHAPTER V

THE. AUSTRALIAN COMMAND

When MacArthur left Corregidor in March, he thought
that in Australia

he would find men, guns, and planes which

he needed to make a counter-attack on the Philippines or at
1 ast on the Japanei~Je somewhere in the Southwest. faci:fic • 1

The general was given a hero 's welcome when he arrived
in Darwin, but was a.hecked to find out how few troops we:t:e
waiting for him there .

force

a&sembled~

Inatead of finding a great American

he found Australia in danger of being

another Bataan , 2 MacArthur atatea1
The immediate and imperative problem which
confronted me was the defE!nse of Australia
itaelf. Ita actual military situation had
become alm0st desperate • Its fo_!~t-were._,
. W.~@~.. tQ .. _In.~ ~~t?;-~me _~nd Jap nese invas.ion
was momentarily expected, The bulk of its
ground troops we~e in the Middle East,
while the United States had only oue
division p~e sent, and that but partial ly
trained. Its air for_~e . ~~ .... ~<JJ!~PP-e.ci with
almost

ob~olete

P.l4ttEUL .an«l was lacl<:tng

not only in engines. and spare parts, but
in personnel. It@ n,!lV.Y->.-hac;l .nQ car_rielis
or battleehips~ the outlook was bleak.3

Vik ~n

lClartc LGe, Tbe_x Call j ! Pacific, (New Yorlo The
Press, 1943), P• 23.
2lb~_g.' p . 160.

3nouglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, (New York: McGraw...
Hill Book Company, c. 1964), P• 145.
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The force wa not large enough for MacArthur to return
to the Philipp ines.

The best he could do was to get together

'"~hieh

those few plane

he had and send them on that last raid

on Corregidor and ataan ,4
MacArthur received a message from General Mar hall
te lling him t h

t

due to the seriousness of the war in other

areas, there would be a definite limit on what he could
expect .

This meant that the immedi te rescue of the

Philippines would have to wait .
Russia open

t4acArthur proposed that

second front against Japan .

When all of his

propo als were brushed aside, he became convinced that he
wa

opposed by a powerful group of enemies in Washington

whose considerat ions had been influenced by hatred of him. 5
In an interv:l.ew
~ra ld

t-7i th

Bert Andrews

of

th !!ll! Ygrk

Tl:ibune on November 22 , 1944, MacArthur criticized

Washington ' • support of the Pacific W
ar.

The general stated

that:

• • • the Pacific war had been starved in
the :l.ntere t s of Europe • • • that if he
had been given a portion of the f0rce which
invaded North Africa, he could have retaken
the Philippines in t~ee months because at
that time the Japane•e were not ready . • • •
We nutde the same old mi&take of intervening
' Zi Lee, .22•

V..!•, p . 286.

5lbid . ' p . 161.
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in European quarrels which we can't hope
to solve becau e they are insoluble. He

said that Europe is a dying system. • • •
that the history of the world would be
written in the Pacific for the next 10,000
years • • • • 6
The general appears to have been

trildng back at Washington

for neglecting hitn nd brushing away his proposals.
own mind , he

In his

eemed to be striking at powerful enemies who

were trying to ruin him.
The

~~~~t

Chiefs had appointed

~e~thur Suprem~

CQmllU.inder of the Sout;:hwest: facifie, Admiral Wil liam F. Halsey

Commander of the South Pacific, and Admiral Che.s ter Nimitz
Commander of the Central Pacific. 1 There wa

some concern

that this type of command might cause friction.

Admiral

Halsey stated:
I emphasize Supreme CO'ra!.Uander to establish
the realization that MacArthur and 1
commande~ everything in our respective

areas ..... army, navy, marines, a.nd allies;
troops, ships, planee, and supplies . . . . · Thi$ was my first experience with a
cempoeite command, and 1 was determined
that our job should not be slowed by
interaervice friction. I need not have
6aeport by Bert Andrews, ~~w l9U H§!rald T;!bune, from
MacArthur to Forre8tal, 194!•, in Waltet" Millis (e~d .),!!:!!!
'QU§§tf!l Diarie~, (New Yor.ks The Viking Press, MacMillan
Company, l9Sl), PP• 17·18,
7w:tlliam F, Halaey, Adm!tral J.talfex.' s §J:orx, (New York:
Whittlesey Hou e, McGtaw... Hill Book Company, Inc_, e. 1947);
p . 138.
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worried. • • • 8
Sometimes the problem of one commander overstepping
another•s command occurred, as this entry in the diary of
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal testifies:
• • • Vice Admiral Kinkaid has in hi
forces under MacArthur six old battleships . Two of the e need to be sent
back for repair . Nimitz made this
suggestion but had to get MacArthur's
agreement . MacArthur desires to hold
them and has so stated. In exercising
hi s perogatives of command, if he insists
on thia order, he will in a sen e be
overstepping into the broad authority
of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. The units
MacArthur needs to accomplish his
objectives • • • are obviously a thing
of vital interest to him , but the determination of when s ips , eed overhaul or
may be necessary for other operations is
obvious~y the interest of • • • Admiral
Nimitz .
On the othelt'

hand~

MacArthur spokesmen had frequently

stated that their chief was being slighted on material an4
jurisdiction and might be forced to t alc:e a back seat to
Admiral Nimitz and others . 10

-

8lbid .
9Entry in the iary of James B, Forrestal, 1943 , in
Millis (ed.), 'file Forresta} DiaJ:ie , (Net\1 York: The
Viking Press, MacMillan Company, 1951), p . 26 .
~alter

lOJo eph Driscoll, .f'cifio Victory, (New York: J , B.
Lippincott Company, c . 1944), p . 78.
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Early in 1942, the Japanese had gained a foothold at
Lae, Salamaua. and Finschhafen; t his was strengthened by

J the construction of a chain of sir and staging bases to the
west at Madang, Wewak, Hollandia ., and to the Indies .

They

\
\

decided to move down the coast to the

Buna~Gona

area in

Papua , where they set up a base and continued a drive overland to Port Moresby.ll
The concept in Australi

defense .

seemed to be one of pass ive

General MacArthur felt that this could only end

in defeat .

The general s tated:

I decided to • • .. move the thousand mi l es
forl.,.ard into eastern Papua, and to stop

the Japanese on tne rough mountains of the
Owen Stanley Range of New Guinea- ... to make
th fight for Aus tralia beyond its own
borders. If successful, this would save
Australia from invasion and give me the
opportunity to pass from defense to
o ffensive~ to seize the initiative , move
forward, and attack.12
MacArthur was able to launch his offensive in
September of 1942, due to the arrival of a division of
American troops, w:lth the holding of the enemy in check
outside Port Moresby.

New

liFrank o.

Yor~: J ,

The gener 1 h d long

ince m.art(ed

'

Hough ,. The i s land !if!. , .(Philadelphia and

B. Lippincott Company, c . 1947), p .

12Mac.Arthur, .2.2•

.£!!, , p. 152.

91~
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the Milne Bay area as a probable Japanes= landing point, and
as early as June he had moved in a strong force of Australian
troops, keeping them well under concealment .
force

't>~hich

landed here wa

The Japanese

counterattacked before they

could dig in, and were wiped out i n a week of fighting .
Fighter plane

fr.om the Port Moresby strip provided cover

for an increasing number of bombers flown over from
in Australia.
dumps in the

The

e bombers made heavy raids on supply

Buna~Gona

region which was cutting the enemy

facing Port More by off from food and ammunition .
began

ai~fields

They soon

to retreat as Austral ian and Amer:i.can forces pressed

them back. 13
• • • he Jap nese troop ,, severed from
all reinforcements, their leaders lost
in action or by suicide, their bodies
worn with starvation and sicl<nelU , and
their morale shattered by the unrelent~
ing blowe of their attackers, were
fina.lly forced to yield their positions.
On January 2, 1943 1 the Buna Mission
f 11; Sanan nda followed, and on January
22nd, the apua Campaign L after siK
months ~f bitter, a asel ss struggl
ended . 1
Thus for the fir · t time in World War II , .Mat;:Arthur

I3Fletcher Pratt, War fer the li<>rl4t (New Haven, Yale
University Press, c~ 1950): P• 75.
14MacA:rthur, .!2 • c; t .-, p . 165.
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took the offensive by land, sea, and air.

This offensive

was small, but it was the most _fmportant news to come out of
MacArthur's Headquarters in a long time .

This was the first

big air-borne troop t ran porting job taken on by the United

States in a theater of operations . lS
The Japanese began to strengthen garrisons at Lae and
Salamaua on Huon Gulf after defeats at Buna and Gona.
was to be MacArthur's next objective .

Thi s

A convoy was sighted

on March 1, 1943, heading to reinforce Lae.

General Kenney,

MacArthur's air chief, now readied his American-Royal
Australian Air Force in Papua., and attcking the convoy
accomplished one of the most devasting air attacks on ships
of the entire war with the exception of Pearl Harbor . l6
The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan in May of
1943, which called for the unconditional surrender of Japan .
This woul d require a large supply base.

The plan called for

the taking of island b ses which could be used as " stepping
stone • ..

Admir 1 Ninlitz was to conduct

opet'ation~

through

Japanese held island , while General MacArthur was to proceed

IS"Toward a Japless Net-1 Guinea , u Time , 40:31,
November 16, 1 42> p . 31 .
16 amuel Eliot Morison, H! .._.t;;or,x ,2! .Y.!l!ted ~a~es Naval
Operations in World War 11,, (Boston: Little , Brown, and
Comp ny, l9Zi7), p . 272. -
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northwest along the

ew Guinea coast.l7

MacArthur stated that "ground , air, and sea operations

.

were thoroughly co-ordinated," and that "it was a new type
of campaign--three dimen ional warfare--the triphibious
concept . nl8
General MacArthur and Admir 1 Hal ey agreed that the
first step of the drive was to reduce Rabaul .
the center of things in the South Pacific .

be denied the use of Rabaul,

Mac~thur

Rabaul was

If Japan could

could drive up the

New Guinea coast with his s award flank and secure this base,
The Central Pacific assault could then begin without fear of
Rabaul's bombers.
norther n Solomons .

To get Rabaul a base was needed in the
MacArthur and

l~l sey

agreed on

Bougainvil.le • 19
In order to win the Huon Peninsula, MacArthur landed
a force at Nassau Bay, which lie
Salama.ua.

This

t~as

eleven miles south of

a town located on the south s ide of the

• "17M.' HBnlon Cannon, Leyte: T1:1e Retul;'n to the
P.Jt~l~.R!;in~.!, (Washington D. C.: Depar tment of the Army,
1954)' p . 2 .

18MacArthur, .22• .£iS• ,. pp . 16.5~166 ..
19Robert Leckie, §t:~ong _n ~to;g, (New York:

House Inc . , e . 1962), p . 159 .

andmn
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Markham River .
took Lae.

In order to

isol~te Salamaua , the general

Once he had done this, its occupation would cut

the supply line of Salamaua .

On September 4, the general

landed an Australian regiment east of Lae, and on the next
day, an American pa achute regiment was dropped to

gr~b

the

airfield of Nadzab, 19 m le s northwest of Lae . 20
cArt:httr' e forces, sup or·t ed by the Seventh

General

Fleet , seeur d Papua,

Admiral

1

e1 was able to take an

airfield in Bougainville from whe:re the

irforae could bomb

Rabaut,21
In .both parallel

op~r

tion$ ,

cArthur and Ha lsey

used a strategy called "leap- frogging . '

was to

by~pa$S

where there

tle

w~re

trong islands

The idea of this

nd land amphibious forces

relatively few Jap nese troops.

would 'build an airfield and, along wi h

Here they

llied na-val

supremacy, eould cut off the by•pa ·ed islands . 22
Ma~Arthur

tated:

It was practical applicat ion of this type

·-'-

2u~ ·. r~c·; Fuller~ I~t - §ec91J51 rr~51o ~.x 1 39·1945 ,
(Lonclont Eyre and Spottiswoode·, 1 48
p . 198.

21samuel Elia . or" s~n,, .!L!..!.SX .:._g 9om2~om~s.e ~
(Boston : Little, ro~m, and Comp ny, e- 19585, p . 92 .
22 lbid
\ . ,p . 93.
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of warfare .... to avoid the fro·ntal ttack
with its terrible los s of life~ to bypass Japanese strong- points and neutralize
them by cutting their lines of supply; to
isolate their armies and starve them from
the battlef1eld; to, as \~illie Keeler u ed
to say, ''hit 'em where they ain•t"- .. tha.t
from thi time forwa~d guided my movements
and operations . Thi decision enabled me
to accomplish the concept of the dire~t
target approach from Papu to Manila. 3

The "isl nd hopping" could have taken years, a.ceording

to Samuel Eliot Morison, but MacArthur's idea of uleapfrogging" changed this .

Before he died General Tojo told

MacArthur that "leapfrogging" t'las one of the three principal
fact ors that def ated Japan.24
Japanese counter-strategy was to f rtify a new
defensive p ri eter from Saipan through Tru

Bismarcks to

i mor.

Th ir p1rpose

~as

and the

t o delay and wear

down the kneriean and Australian offensives, ma inta in the
East Indian fronti r vdth strong ground forces, and to get

ready to catch

The

·h

United States Pacific Fleet off guard . 25

tr tegic posit "on in th

fall of 1943 in the

·~ 23t1ac.Arthur, .22• cit., P - 166 .

24samuel Eliot Mori on, ~

Little, Brown, and C pany,

~·

P9e;,.!! !!~.I ,. (Boston:
l 63}, p . 282.
'1.1-10

25s~suel E~1.ot MQrison, St,~a ~.egy Jtnd <f_omg;romis~,

(Bostou:

L:~..ttle ,

Brown ,

nd C,ompa.ny, c . 1958}, p . 93 .
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Southwest Pacific was this: MacArthur 's Australian-American
forces had

ecured eastern New Guinea and were prepar ing to

invade the Bi smarc s.

In two years of fighting, the United

States had yet to take any land which h d been t alen from us
or one of our

The

l lie.

.ince the war began . 26

trat gi c le dershi

of General MacArthur along

with the energy of his air commander, General George Kenney ,
combined to prod ce a most effect. ve a i T.- ro1nd partnership .
~fac.Arthur 1 s

trate gy

't-78. S

t o use 1 nd.. ba ed plan .s to cover

leap.s up the New Gui n.e a coa.s t and into the Philippines.
Army got its leap

covered, and the

bases from whi.eh t:o ga1.n air

The

ir force got island

upremaey· and advance to where

its bombers co ld get a t Japa .27
MacArthur, at the age of 64. wa$ as air-minded as the
younge

a ge .

t

pilot .

He ha

learned a. great lesson of the air

He had le rned that 1t was poor $tr tegy to needlessly

expose t t ·oop

ot: ships to an enemy with air supremacy .

Wewak

waa a s trong baSe; and instead of immediate invaeion,
MacArthur had Kenney sen a contingent of his air force to

Z0Hougii", .212.• £!_ .,
27Kent ~· ert

War

p . 125.

.U• A. ,,ggcpns i~§!r.a;ot,to:n,

Press, 1963), p. 111,

rica.n S;tt:~q;e,gJ: ,in Woli~d
(Baltimore1 The John • s Hopkins

Greenf eld ,
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make ra.ids on the ba e . 28

Rabaul had always been the ma i n obj ective of Operation
Wa t chtOl<ler, and it was a shock to MacArth r wllen Genet.>al

Marshall
ing it .

ugges ted that he leapfrog Rabaul in t ead of a sault•
Rabaul's

ubs ti tute wa

a nd Manus in the A.dmir 1 tie •

to be Kavieng in New Ireland
The great l eap, coupled later

with a decision to bypass Kavieng as well. proved to be

There were still close to tOO 000 defenders

for tunate .

under. a tough and resourceful gener 1 on

baul .

Since it

had been a stockpil1ng baee for var1ou · inva ions which
never came off , the Japanese garrison had plenty of
ammunition, and

upplies .

weapon s ~

This le p th t isolated Rabaul

was made by MacArthur w! th a reconnai s nee force .

general t hought that a f orce of tbi

size

\'74

The

attge enough

to make a brisk retr at if the enemy wa

there in s trength.

The general dec ide d to let this force re

:t.n and to rein--

force them quickly.

cArthuT, fr

hi$ knowledge of

Japanese ground tactic , rightly pr edicted t hat the enemy

woul d co 1it his army piecemeal, and that each mall group
could be defeated . 29

-

2Bsamu l ..EU.ot

Mori

"on, ~P!. ~

Oc.:1a.n J1ar, (Boetont

B~own ~

and Company , c , 1963), p. 291 .

!2-ts· ,

p . 294 .

Littl ,
29

°

I

I
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MacArthur

tated:

Rel,ba.ul was being steadily emascul .a ted .
Enemy thrusts f rom that o ee•powerful
tronghold w re b coming v.<ea ~ and

and by t e end of February ,
:i r supperrt whatso vet- . In
pite of replacements and r inforcements ,
the once .. p -w rful
pane e ir fore in
this area had been defeated almost to the
point of extinction . 30
,
ineffectual~

1 · l~4, had no

· With R.abaul

eal d off, Mac rt 1ur • s ·nex

le pfrog the strong Japanese force at

whet:e he would

at up ne 1

Kenney had b en

advanc~

to

into Hollandia,

he dquart:er • · General

king massive a.ir assaults, which had

almost knocked out Hollandi
l-18

\~ewat<

move wa

as an enemy air base ..

There

not one enemy plane wh eh rose ·rom the five tar get

fields to intercept ca~rier-based bomber . 31
On the night of Apri l 21, 1944, cr isers and desttoyers
began fir it g the pre l minary bombar

nt, and after do.wn • the

latter day, landing forces moved in ag inst the b aches of

Aita.pe and Hollandia .
roc~et•

un boats.

This

~1as

Resistance wa

proe ded by intense fire fl.!'om
light in both places.

By

Ap1:il 23, all the airfield$ were in American hands and our

-·

30M8cArt:htlr, .!m.· cit., p . 181.

3-ls m~ 1 liot Mor ison~ ';rh't 1'!.2 Oc ..!11 W· , · ~Boston:
Little, lb;_own1 an9 Oo~pany, c~ , 1963); P·· 294~ ·
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fighters were being set up on Aitape air strip . 32
Hollandia was the crucial move in the Pacific; this
move w • as important to the end in New Guinea as Leyte was
to the conquest of the Philippines.

The Japanese were

caught off guard and resistance soon faded .

MacArthur joined

the inv aion force , for he wished to $et up a major base at
this point .

The Americana were able to

captu~e

some valuable

supplies at Holland1a, for the Japanese had uaed it s a
upply depot .

Aa the forces mov d inland resistance was

tougher, but by August of

1~44,

the conquest of the northern

coatt of New Guinea was eompleted. 33
General MacArthur needed no· ul!'ging to push weetward
rapidly along the coalt of New Guinea .

He had already out·

lined to hi s staff a series of a$taul . - which pointed toward
Mindanao by November 1.5 , 1944 .,3 4

It had been the general's intention to proceed by a

aeries of nvelopm nta up the eoaet of New Guinea and :lnto
the Philippi nes .
and air .

By this time, he had superiority of the sea

This enabled MacArthur to

land hi a force a where the

32Pratt, .!.2• e~t . , p . 269~
33tbid , . PP • 269•270.
34 Samuel El :lot Mor:Lton, The Two_Ocean Wa;r , (Boston:
Little , Brown, and Company. c . 1963); p, 319 .
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Japanese were the weakest and confine their stronger forces
to areas in which the Japanese were caught in pockets from

which they could never break out.

Thi

resulted ·in ·hundreds

of thousands of Japanese troops being isolated in Pacific
jungles at the time of urrender . 3S
In little more than three montha, MacArthur advanced
550 milei from Hollandia to Cape Sanea.por .

He had acquired

three big Jap ne ·e air baeeas Hollandia , Wakcle, and Bial ,
which he picked up enroute and a fourth, Wewak was leap•
frogged . 36

These reault8 bad been achieved through expert
planning and great teamwork between the

Army, Navy , and Air•

fo¥ce of the United Stat a and Australia, but as Samuel
Eliot Morilon has stated: "It i s questionable w·hether they

could hav '. been attained under any other commander but

MaoA:rthur .

Th<»ae who served under him , in ttThat:ever arm of

the aervice or from whatever country, greatly respected
tl

his military judgment and leadership .

smartly executed, and took place

0n

Hie operation• wer e

or close to the set

35~orge c. )~~shall, H. H. Arnold, and Erne•t J. King ,
The War Repo!(tf, ,eg: Forwarded \)y W
alte't Millia. (Phila6elphia
and New Ytn-tu :,. B.. Lippinc~tt Company, e , 1947) • .p . 220.

36siunue1 Eliot Morison, Ih!! Two Qc~an !!t• (Bo•ton:
Little, Brown, and Company, c ., 1963) • P • 322 . ·
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I•

target dates -vJi t h very few snarls . 37
Ti e genera l had reason to move fast; he wa s imbued
wi t

a burning determination to return to t he Phi lippines

and avenge t he humi liating defeats whic h the Americans had
suffered in 1941 and 1942 .

There was also the obli gation
.

·--·

--~

--

of the United States to the Filipino people , and this could
not be ignored . 38
MacArthur fe lt t hat Hollandia would give him a jumping
off place for Mindanao , the southernmost island of t he
Plilippines, where he was s ure there would be substantia l
Philippine s upport . 39

The general sent t he fo llowing to the

Joint Chiefs :
It is my opinion that purely mi litary
considerations demand the re occupa ti on
of t he Philippines in order to cut t he
enemy ' s communications to t he south
and secure a. ba se for our further
advance •• , . Moreover, if t he Uni te d
States s hould de liber ately bypass the
Philippines, leaving our prisoners ,
nationals, and loyal Filipinos in enemy
hands wi t hout an ef for t to retrieve them
at t he e ar l iest moment, we woul d have
the gravest psychological reaction • • • 40
37Ibid .
38cannon , ~ ·

£!!., p . 2.

39Jose ph Driscoll, The Pac ific Vic tory--1945 , ( New
York : J . B. Lippincott Company , c . 1944), p . 21.
40 _(.,... 'l.nn ~Jn , op • .£.__
it . , p . 4 •

-
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General Mar:thall cautioned

cArthur to "be careful

not to let per onal feelings and Philippine polities" over•
ride the great objective, which was to end thew r .
pointed out that "bypa

ing" was not the same a

He also

abandon ..

ment . 41
General MacArthur '\laS invited by General Marshall to

attend a conference at Pearl Harbor in order to confer with
) Admiral Nimitz on future pl ns for the war in the Pacific .

)

When he arrived, the general found President Roosevelt, who
invited the officers to dinner , took out a map, pointed to
Leyte and said, uwell Douglas, wheJ:e do we go from her e?"42
The Navy propo•ed a move going directly into Formosa
from Sa1pan and Mindanao; bypassing the Philippines .
MacArthur wa1 Still intent on liberating the Philippines and
ueing Luzc~m for the

pringboard to Japan . 43

General MacArthur, as he later explained it, made a

strong emotional argument:
, • • M:tlital:ily, I felt that if I could
secure the Philippine$, it would enable
u1 to clamp an air and naval blockade on
the flow \of all aupplies frOTQ the south

41&biq .•
42~bid., P+ 5.

43samuel Eliot Morison, S~r&tesx ,mW Comero.mi•e;
(Boston: Little, Bltown, and Company, c, 1958), p. 98.

-- - -
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to Japan, and thu , by p ralyzing her
indu trie$, foTc her to early c pitulat ion • •• •1 felt that Formo a, with a
hoat:Ue population, might prove doubtful
to serv'e as a base for attack against
Japan itaelf. I was aleo eritieal of
what 1 re ga~ded as a
jor blunder in
originally abandoning all effort to
relieve the Philippines, •• ,. It wa not
only a moral obligation to relea e this
f riendly pQSBeS ion ft:om the enemy • • •

but that- to fail to do •o ~ould not be
understandable to the Ot;:tental mind .
Not to do Ot lllot'eovtu:, "t<;rt;;uld result in
the eath of thoulands of pr:i.so11ers·,
inelu 1nf American women, children, and
men eivi 1ana, held in ~ilipp1ne concentration camps • • • •4
lt was finally decided not to bypal
suppo~t

but to

of Mindanao .

the Philippine$ ,

MacArthur's inva4ion of the islands by way
There

tfaS

also, at the emne time, to be a

vigorous advance by the fleet

tow~rd

either Formosa

o~

I

The Pre . ident

Lu~on .

app~oved

the· e plan and it looked

like the Navy and MaeAltthur would be working together in
ha~ony

in the Paeifie .

~eArthur

app;oved and said that

be would change hi · plana. accordingly . 45
Ther.e seemed to be no strong di agreetn.en t be tween

General MacArthur and AdmiTal

N1~1t~.

Admiral Leahy ltatedt

44Mac'A rthur • .2!• c:t~ . ~ pp . 197·198 .
'

'

45-w.i lliam ». ~·ahy , l WJS IJ;let:_e • {_N$w Yolik: Whittle8e}l'
House, MeGraw-Hill Book :OOJ;tlPI!lny, lne., c . 1950), p. 230 .
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I pers$nally w convinced that they
together we~e the beet qualifi .d offie rs
in out" service for thiS tremendous ta I<;
and they could work tdgether in full
a~eement toward the common end of
def ating J p n . 46
-

There were othea1$ who
lao.

favo~eci

the Philippines firlt

Samuel Eliot Morison atated that Formosa ' 1\qould have

been a difficult island upon which to obtain a lodgntent, 11
be¢ause "it · stepping tone to the m.ainlancl of Japan would
not have

materiali~ed.

aince by that time Japan firmly con•
'

t"1'olled the entire eoaat of China. •t47

Admiral Leahy f,tated

that "from a pu:trely atr tegical point of viet~, I lvae in

favor of the Philipp:t·ne operation. n4S

Admit: 1 Halsey felt

that 1 t watt neeeesuy ancl profitable to go into the

Philippine , fo:r he conaidered them to b uthe vulnet:able
belly of the Imperial Jb:agon. n49

Genetta.l Wedem.eye1!' s tated

that the move to the Philippin s would "iaed:i.ately

C'$Ut

the

enemy liuet from Japan to hia conquered territory to the
$()U tbwatd • 1tS0

....

. 'l46tbld ,'

\

-

\

47&unuel Eliot ~rison, 1i!itt~'l-5~ID' .!U.4 S.~e~o,mie~\;
(Boston: Little, Bro~ , and .Company, c, 1958), P•' .§9. \
•

\

•

1

4SIJeahy • a~ £~1= ·, p ~ 229.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that none of thele
currently Selected objective · could be by•p s , ed .
therefore, continued to find a meal\
I

Pacific might be .tepped up.Sl

· ."51 cannon, .l oe . ill.

They.

by '~hieh the war in the

CHAPTER VI

THE RECONQUEST OF THE PRILIFPINES
The purpose of the Leyte Cam.pa:tgn waa to e tabliah an

air and logi t ical ba e i n the Leyte area in order to
suppo~t ope~ation

1n t he Luzon••Formosa-·China coaat area

and part icularly t o nullify Japane e . trength on Luzon.
wa · hoped that th

field&J and base s:tte

yt$

It

Valley could be u ed for major air•

from which large ... acale operations could

be launched again$t the re$t of the Philippin s . l

The Join t Chief$ orde1:ed Gener 1
plans for a t'etur n t o Mindanao,

Ma.cArth~:r

_to. prepare

eut her.mnoat i land of the

Philippine , tori t h a target dat e of November 15 t 1944 .
June 15, MacArthur i s ued a pla

Philippines.2 MacArthur

On

for the r .e tak:tng cf the

tated:

~ ·y

plan , called ~-~!eno,tt was based on the
prem:Uie that the P lllppine Archipelago,

lying dir. ctly in the main tea routes
from Japan to the source fbf hel' raw
materials and oil in the Netherland
lndie , Malaya, and Indo China; was the
most strat egic Gbjective in the South-

west Faeifie area .

Whoever

~ontrolled

the air and naval bales itt the Philippine
lsl. u\s l o i cally control l d the main

_1M, 'iaUlon C~nnon , !6xtze; I\1!
(l-1a hil-tgtc>n D, C.: Dep tment .o f the

-r'-·

2Ib1d., p. 2 .

I

i;;urn se, the P)l~l~RPil.te•,
y , l954),p . 1 ,
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artery of supply to J pan •a factol;'iee •••
• "Reno" enabled our ,fore
to depart from
a baae eloteat to the obj. ctive , and
advance against the most lightly ~rganized
poa:tt:t.on of the enemy'a defenses, effect..
ing a deci ive penetr tion • • • • Initi 1
lodgment wel:' to be effected in southern
Mindanao on Noveml:>er lS j and . t Leyte Gulf
on Decem er 20th. • • •
The major effort of this operation was to be an
amphibioua landing with force• mounted from New Guinea for
th

taking of bate · on Leyte.

Leyte would then b made into

an excellent apringboa;r;d from which ta launch later attaek$
against the Japanese in Formosa

01:

in the reat of the

Ph11:1ppinee.4
t~hen

the Joint Chiefs. ask d MacAl:thur and Nimitz

their opinions on advancing the target date& by by-pa8sing
any presently aeleeted objective - , the commanders were in
agr ement.

They both stated that it: wat imposaible unless

eertain conditions ehangecl.

Gen tal MaeAwthur added that

bypas · :tng any objeetivea before the seizure of Formo•a was

not practical .

An ttack against Formoea would have no

land•ba$ed

ir s upport, fer they were baaed on Hawaii 5 ,100

milea away.

He felt :tt wa$ necessary to take Luzon and le t

'3ii'outi'ias

MacArthur, ~§,min~ s;!.nc,es, (Net! Yor~; McGtta'tf•
Hill Book· C0mpany, 1964), PP~- 210•211"
4
I'
Cannon , .21!. s.!.r· , p . · ~ •
I
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up land-based aircraft first.s

As plans stood, General MacArthur would continue his
advance along western New Guinea, Truk was to be neutralized
by fast carrier strikes, the Mariana

Central Pacific force

were to be occupied by

starting June 15, and Mindanao was to

be taken by MacArthur, supported by the Pacific Fleet , in

November of 1944.6
Early in 1942, General MacArthur's headquarters began
to receive messages from guerrilla forces in the Philippines .

Recognition was slow at first, for the general wasn't sure
that they were from the guerrillas .

By August, he had tried

to get in touch 'tr7ith members of the movement .

Two radios

were set up, and the e furnished MacArthur information on
Japanese activities in the area .

As a result , the

ge11era.l

was able to piece together a fairly good picture of Japanese
strength , disposition$, and fortifications on Leyte .

They

were not only a great help in intelligence, but bolstered
the morale~ spirit, and loyalty of the Filipino people . 7
On Augu t 31, 1944, General MacArthur issued his fir s t

5 Ibid. , p • 3 •

\
6samuel Eliot MOrison, Strategx and Comnr omise ,
(Boston : Little, Brown; and Company , c . 1958) , p . 97 .
7cannon, ~·

£!!., pp . 18, 20 .
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formal directive covering proj ect d operation
t he Philippines.

Th

'·

II.

The force

on Mindan o ,

Leyte oper tion wa

of tl Sout

in the area of

to be known as King

st P e ifi c wer

to capture area .

yte, and amar in or er to set up air, n val.

and logi tic bases to cover later Philippines operations. 8
On September llt Admiral Bull Halsey, di covering t he
we knes

of Japanese

ir power in the Philippines,

that all the Palau, Yap, Morot 1,

ugge ted

nd Mindanao 1 ndi g be

called off in favor of an immedi t

thrust on Leyte . 9

Hal ey conferred with MacArthur and sent message$ to
Admir 1 Nimitz and the .Joint Chie f s, recommending t hat a
j

int assault be

ahe d of

chedule .

G neral

c~mpl

o

October 20, two m t hs

The J-o-in t Chief

Mars t~ll

which d monstr""t d
to

e on Leyt

received a

notabl~

concurred . 10
a ge from

· cAt· thur

&cr . tte gic flexibility; "Subject

tion of arrangem nts with Nimitz, we shall execute

Leyte Oper tion on 20 Octob
'-.

• •

. M$cArthur .. " 11

Btbici:-;-p . 23 .
9 Rob rt Leclie, StrQ~S

en

A£ffi,9 ,

(New York: Random

Hou e, Inc . , c . 1962), p . 394 .
10 amuel Eliot
ri on, t ,.at,egx .!J. -2. pro!!-! ,
(Bos ton:. Little, rown, nd Comp~my, c . 1958) , P• 102 .
llcannon, Jm • <!-t t •, p . 9 .
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m:tlit ry forces at1d

In early October, MacAr hur •

Admiral. Kinl<ai "s S v nth Fleet began to concentrate at

Manu , Holl.

dia., an

-----

other plac

alo.ug the New Guine

Coast .

On October 10, the North ard mov ntent ·egm: , and by October

18, all

_ .t~ i

lands con·

nd:lng the entrances to Leyt-e Gulf

ha~_ be n secured by ranger .12

The Joint C ie f s directed Admiral Nimitz to suppor t
MacArth r'

operation again t Leyte.

Admiral Hal

y's Third Fleet

Admiral Ni mitz ordered

o "destroy enemy naval and a.ir

forces in or threat ning the Philippin
~

Three we

area . "13

before the gre t naval

a ttle a t Leyte,

October 14, 1944, t1e Joint C i e fo decided t o liberate Lazon

and Manila as

cArthur had 4lraya w ted.

·neral

was r j eeted on pr ctical

the landing

on

Leyte

ounc1s .

before the en

of 1944 .

nor.thern Luzon wer

s~ con

u ed here

mphib1ous operation

Landin s at L n ay n

put on t1e progr

os

It wa s decided that i f

went wel l, the five divi i on

in reserve would b r eady f o a

Fo

for

ulf in
c

ber of 1944 . 14

12's~uelEliot
rison , ~
Th~ J:Jl.S Ocean
Nar . ( Boston:
'">:J~
Little, Brown, and Company , e .• 1963), p . ·433 .

l3c nn

• ~ - c!t . , p . 30 .

14Samu 1 Eliot ~ris9n , . $~~BtSBI ~~q ~ 2r2m1~e ,
(Boston: t ttl e, Brown , and Company c . 1~58), pp . 111-112.
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MacArthur

tated:

1 had no illus.ion about the oper t1on.. I
knew it wa to be the crucial battle of
the wa:a: in the Pacific . On ita outcome
would dep nd the fate of the Philippines
and the future of the war a gainst Japan.•
Leyte was to be the anvil g inst which
I hoped to hamme:t> the Japanese into submis ion b1 the central .Ph:J.lipp1nes- ... the

pringboard from which 1 could proceed
Luzon~ for the fin 1
as ault against Japan itself •• • .• 15
to the conquest of

MacArthur gave G ner 1 Kenn y'

Thi

mission wa

ir force its mi ssion.

to make aerial reconnaissance, co-ordinate

with carrier•baaed aircraft to neutr lize hostile forces in
range of the islands, to protect convoys, and to destroy
Japanese shipping and installations in tl~ area . 16
MacArthur stat d that the ground operations .would be
itt four phases:

••• Phase one covered minor preliminary
landings to secure small ,.eland lying
cross th entranoe to Leyte Gulf . Phase
two ineluded the main ttm.p hibious as aults

on Leyte fJ:"om Dulag to Tacloban, and
called for the seizure o£ the irstrip,
an advanc through Leyte V lley, and the
opening of San Juanico and Panaon Straits .•
The third p se con isted of the necessary
overland and shore•to•shore oper tiona to
co plete the capture of Leyte and the
sei2ure of southern Samar. Phase fC)ur
lSMaeArthur, !2• cit . , p . 212 .

l 6cannon, R!• ~&~ . , p. 27 .
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contemplated the occupation of the remainder
of Samar and the further neutralization of
enemy positions in the Visayas . l7
During the night of October 19-20,

d~stroye rs

the shore shelled the Japanese forces on land.

near

The American

forces were safely within Leyte Gul f , for the big event had
arrived . l8
The invasion of Leyte precipitated the Battle of Leyte
Gulf .

The Japane se naval force moved in three columns)

converging on Leyte Gulf .

Three Actions followed.

There

was one in Surigao Strait; one off Cape Engano; and one off
Samar Island; together they became the greatest naval battle
of the war . 19
There was later comment that the golden chance to
destroy the entire Japanese Navy at one time had been mi ssed.
However , the victory achieved was enough to convince the
Japanese that they should never again risk their vessels in
a fleet action.20

Admiral Halsey stated :

l7MacArthur, .QE. • ill· , p . 214 .
18 Cannon , .Ql2. . ill· , p • 59 •
19 J.F.C. Fuller , The Second World War--1939-1945 ,
(London : Eyre and SpottTiWoode , 1948), p:-375 .
20Frank o. Hough , The Island War, (l?hiladelphia and
New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, c . 1947) , p . 317 .
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The key point is that we had l"lvO fleets

in the Ph.ilippine waters under separate
commands: My Third Fleet was under the

command of Admiral Nimitz; Tom Kinkaid's
Seventh Fleet was under the command of
MacArthur • • • , In my opiniort, it is
vital for the Navy never to expose itself
again to the perils of a divided command in
the same area..21
MacArthur stated:
• , •• It was a dramatic situation fraught
with disaster • • • • Should the enemy gain
entrance to Leyte Gulf, his powerful naval
guns could pulverize any of the eggshell
transports pre•ent in the area and destroy
vitally needed supplies on the beachhead. •
, , Ashore, all I had been able to do was
call for carrier air cover over the Leyte
beaches. Under the divided command setup,
I had no effectual control over the Third
Fleet- • • • 22
The landings on Leyte were easy, compared with most

amphibious operations in World War II.

The weather was

perfect, there was no surf, no mines or underv1ater
obstacle$, slight enemy reaction, mostly mortar fire.
Therefore, "liberation of the Philippinea was off to a

21w1i11am F. Halsey, ,Adm~r!\ ~~say's ~t;Qri, (New
York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
c. 1947), p. 210.
22MaeArthur, .2l!• cit., pp, 227 .. 228.
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good start.u23
took p1 ce lees t

The landing

Achnir 1 Halsey had sent h:ts fir t

Japane ere is nee.

fa

st pice
record. 24
t

n

ntea&

ix week8 after

reporting light

Tni · w $ th r ault of one of the

of major ,battle pl ·n ning on United State$

Gener 1 MacArthur, :President
nd other offic _r

o~

waded a hore Oil. the

na, Getle3l'al R.omulo,
tbi~d

a .aault wave .

To millions of Filipino& MacArthur spoke from the beaohe

over

portable r dio tr nsmitter.

The 8 neral said:

f the !'hil_iPI!!!!~~-- ...-.~-..;v.! • • •t,__ :ve
: ·- .;·---;~liy ·t ;o m • • • • Let
the :tndomitabl fpirf.t e>f Bataan nd

PeQple

return -d·~ ·

Cor1:egidor l.ead on aa the lines of
batt! roll fo ard to · bring you within
the zr,e of operations, tise and strike .

•. . s

\

The American people joyfully r eeived the t1ews of the

auece ·s of the American forees in establi bing the first
foothold in the Philippine$"

Pr lident Rooaevelt congrat..

u1ated MacArthur saying that: .. you have the n tion • _

"" .

23'samuel

Eliot Morison, The n~~ Oce§q W§t:, (Boston:

Little, Brow, and Company, e . 19 ·3), p. 235 .
24 u &ttle for th ,Philippine · , " I?.!t;9ne, 31: 164,

June, 1945 .
---------=2'-"-5MaeAr-thut;-,~. ,

pp.

216·2-:~1----------------
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gratitude and the nation's prayers for success as you and
your men fight your way back. , •• u26
The airfields of Dulag and Taclobaa fell into our
hande on October 21, and Army Engineers immediately went to
work improving them. 27
There was lighter resistance during the first days of
battle, and because of the successes, General MacArthur
thought it would not be necessary to use the 77th Infautry
Diviaion, now of Guam, on Leyte.
ferred control of
Admiral Nimitz.

tt~

On

October 29, he tt·ana-

division from General Kreuger to

Shortly afterward, the Japanese began their

reinforcement of Leyte, and a captured .Japaneae field order
revealed an all-out offensive would be laLu1ched again$t

American forces in mid-November.

This led MacArthur to ask

Nimitz to direct the 77th Division to tl1e Taclobara area on

Leyte.

Nimitz replied that they were being sent to Manus,

and when they arrived, operational control would revert to
MacArthur.

The general then ordered this division to Leyte

on November 15, where they were to be controlled by General
\

I

·· 2ocal1non , 9.2. cit • ~ p • 84 •

27samuel Eliot Morison, .!!:!! Two Ocean !!.!I• (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, c •. 1963},' p~35.
----

------······--

--

17
Kreuger. 2B
On December 7, the 77th Div!eion was landed three
miles south of Ormoc.

This placed tlw Japanese forces in

this area between two fires.

The Ormoc area was taken and

by the end of December, the whole island waa cleared.29

The Japane1e had lost more than half their navy.
Leyte wae to

tl~

war in the Pacific

wt~t

war in Europe; it was the crushing blow.

St. Lo was to the
Documents,

captured from the Japanese, showed that they were completely
deceived by MacArthur'• landing on Leyte in 1944, for they
expected a two prong attack in northern Luzon and Mindanao.30
there were strong disagreements which developed betweeu
the War and Interior Departments aa to who should administer

Civil Affairs in the Islands.

The Interior Department wanted

a civil representative of the High Commiasioner of the

Philippines to accompany the asaault troop•·
insisted that he should not.

MacArthur

The President stepped in and

resolved the argument in favor of MacArthur, who was to

28cannon, .2£• cit •• p. 276.
29Hough, .21!.• cit., p. 3 77.

30Richard H. iovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.,
Tr..e General and_ t:hr f.r...!tJ~e~~ t_(New Yot:k: :Far~ar, Stra'tl_L__ ····-····-·---····--····-··· and Young, c. 19Si), p. 288~
.
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devise his own policy for civil affairs during the reoccupation of the Fhilippines..

The general c:reated a civil affairs

unit in his headquarters and outlined the policies to be
followed.

MacArthur would delegate the administration of

civil·affa1rs and relief in the liberated areas as soon as
poaaible to a representative of the Conmronwealth

Gove1~nt.

The only restrictions on Filipinos t-rould be those required
by military necessity.

Tlw Philippine Commonwealth was, by

arrangement with MacArthur, to determine the guilt or
innocence of collaborationists, but United States commander•
were to have authority to deal with suspects if necesaary. 31
The general also set up financial policies to be

followed.

In liberated areas a new series of Philippine

Treasury Certificates would be introduced.
an exchange rate of two per American dollar.

These would have
Wage rates

were to be paid to Filipino laborers at an established rate,
and ceiling prices were set.J2
Eight Philippine Civil Affairs units were attached to

the Sixth Army by MacArthur, which were to aid the field
commanders in the administration of civil affairs and relief.

3Ieann'oi1'; .22• ill•, p. 199.

l2Ibid.

-
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As soon as conflict ended in an area, a civil affairs unit
stepped in t:o restore normal living. 3'=l,,
Orgo.n:f.u~d

resistance on Leyt:c hacl uo sooner ceased

than a nel-1 aea£wlt ·was planned; this
Luzon.34

't'WS

the reconquest of

MacAt·thur stated:

In ti* campaign for the liberation of the
Philippiues, I now faced my final and
decisive objecttve, the recapture of Lu~on.
It was a difficult and dangerous problem,
for the J.npaneso ground for:cco gl~Eultly out ..
n\lmbered my own. I needed one last stepping
stone before a ma!n attack could be launched.

The island of Mindoro was selected.

It was

locat:cc just uouth o:J: Luzon in a (;er.t'i7.rtl position along the coast. lts poasea•ion would
cm.able Fl£1 to retlu:n to my stt·ategy of never.

leaping ahead of my own air cover.

Midway

between T..eyte aud the Lingayeu Gulf area of

Luzon, an airfield on Mindoro could be used
to cover a lafl.ding at L1.rJgaye11 » t7hich was to
be my po:f.nt of assault on Luzon.35

The general hy•paseed many stt:ongly held islands,
striking at Mindoro itt the central Philippines • just south

of Luzon.J6

There camesoveral setbacks, but finally two

American a:l:rff.elds
1944.

~..ve:re

aet up on the island by December 23 1

The battle for Luzon was near, and tho gate to

33tbfd •• p. 200.
34Fuller » 2ll•

ill· ~

p. 3 77.

m~SMacArt;:\'t!!:t .$2. .s..i.£. L.'P·-~J7m!~
36Hough, .2.2• ill•, P• 317 ..
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Lingayen was Mindoro; the keys were now held by MacArthur,37
~1

re~u

November 13•14, of 1944,

ted that Admiwal

The concentration wa

cArthur urgently

lsey continue

trike

on Luzon .

tQ be on the Jap ne e reinforcem nts

which· were b ing m ved 1n .38
It was ealcul ted that nine divi . ions would be needed .
The five divi ion
operation befor

in Leyt:e would be t'eady for another
the end of 1944, and it w s decided tbat

these ·would b enough to invad
land ·~n gs

planned the

20 .

Thi

~as

t

Lu~on ,

The Joint Chiefs had

Lingayen· Gulf in Luzon for December

h r d time•table · to follow as re istance on

Leyte wae prolong d; there had been reviv

power and Ita ik .ze rAids .
Leyte

Wfl;'- ~.

Jap ne ae air

The J panese had decided that

_l(t. a and they wer,e c&ncentrating on defending

Luzon.
---- ..... 39
The Lingayen landings in northern Luzon were postpone

r'

a cct>Uple of 't«1eel<s

nd tool( place on January 9, 1945 .

The general had utilized the same $pet, Lingayen Gulf ; that
A. W:l.ll.oughby and John Chamberlain, !4{!~~~'h!ar,
(New York: McGre.t~·Hill Book Company •-· Inc ., ·e . 19.54),

'37chaJ:l
1?~.1"'! 195!,

p, 237 .

38 amu 1 Eliot ~rison ,

·I'

1:!1! lJ!

Q.eeEa~ War , (Boston:

Little? Brown> and C mpany, c •. 1963), P• 472 .

Cl
the Japanese llaG used three years before.

The initial

resistance was light, for tile main force seemed to have taken
to the mountains on either side.40
Generals

~!ac.Ax·thur

and Kreuger went ashore, and meet•

ing with othe1· commanders, stressed

t~1e

Manila as early as possible in order to

urgency of occupying
f~ee

the Allied

prisoners and inte·.t:neas, who weru slowly starving to death.
General .1.-ia.cArthur stated that our losses had been small and
predicted that the Japanese would evacuate Hanila rather than

defand it.

This was the Japa.aese intention, but orders were

not carried out. 41
'fhe Japar;.ese evidently did not 'l.vant to risk fighting

on the broad c:autral plai"i1, and had taken to the mountains,
leaving the z:·oute open to ?:1anila.. 42
The move to t.-Ia-nila was slow·, and along the way nativES
displayed American and Philippine flags welcoming their

liberators with touching demonstrations.

The Japanese had

ot.·dered Manila evacuated, but 20,000 troops refused to give

qUHough, ~·£!!a, p. 317.
4lsamuel Eliot Morison, The Two Ocean War, (Boston:
Little 1 Brown, and Company, c.-r9'63),' p. 486:-42Ho1JghL1.2£ 1 _ill~_. . . ~~ --······-~·~·-······~~~- ---~--·····-~ --······-
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up and fought on to the bitter end .

The fighting turned to

, inch by inch fighting as many Japaneae

a hou e to hou

def nded Manila . 43
MacArthur stated i

I wa

fighting on ground tl

t

had witnessed

my f t er's mil1t ry tri ph ne rly fifty
year$ earlier and my own eampaigas at the
beginning of th war . 1 kne eve»y wr:lnkl
of th te rain~ every foot of the topography.
I was ble to avoid m ny a pitfall, to
circt111lVent ny a en my trap .. To have
saved l :tvea :l.n thi way i p$rhap my moe t
gratifying mory of the war. My sta££ did
not lik my frontline etivity •• ••

d taken n rly thr e w k to

It
-

-

During the mont

ke Manil •

of battle, the Japanese defense force

were wiped out almoat to a man.

r eh 4, 1945, __t

By

city

of Manila l~d been el ared.~5

Before the fighting

th1

cArt~tr

called a

mbly of Filipino not bl s to Malacanan

provision 1 a
P l ce w re

uded;

f t

i

thering he

r

erv d

_ military governor .

clared the Co

the P ilippinea

premanently reestab1ished
. 46
.
..
...,

_

2i3iior:taon,

.22• eit , , p . 488.

44&oArthur , o • cit . ~ p. 246 t
45Hough t ~· eit .t pp, 317·318 .
46Samuel Eliot Mori .

Little, Bl:own,

ano

ln

r:--

,

on, lJj! lJii20 Qs§ .~ !1!£ ,

ompany, · c. 19 3), P• 288 .

(Boston:

General MacArthur was not 8at1sfied with the liberat :ton o£ Leyte, S mar_ and Luzon .
enemy

fom the ene·re area .

He

w nted to chase the

In February of 1945 , the

Visayas · nd M!nd nao were to be liberat d by the Seventh
Fleet and Eighth Al~.

Th

Joint Chiefs didu t t immediately

pprov of the e plan , as Gener 1
British at Yalta t · t he had

· sh 11 had tol

plan for using

the

jor forces

of the United St · tes to mop up in the Philippines; the
remaind r would be done by Filipino guerrillas .
a

if the .seventh Fleet and the Eigth Army

nd Okinawaf

needed for Iwo Ji
MacArth r

o 4

1

,;~ould

It looked
not be

o the Joint Chiefs let

chose . 4 7

The camp ign wa

finally elo

d.

cAr thur · ts.ted:

On Jul .Jl ,!)_,_ ~ J~·l'l:~~~3~!!1~~ ·.

off~e~ 1 end
.- S ·me minor
isOlate
ctfon of a guer:eU.l
ture in
practic ly unin bit d mount in rang ·
was to be e pected, but th gre t 1 d
m
115,600 _q r - il t ' th its
populati0n of 17,000,000 wa now fee o
the nvader .48
,
Phili~p·_,~- ~-- q,gp,

Pt-e ident Tr

.n

i

d been i.n o ,f ic:e only a

fter the death of Ft;anklin Rooaev lt:-, but h

,-p.

-~. ,_,Q.....
,~~b"""!i""t"~s!•.

bo'rt time

wired the

4 0 •·

I--------4__:_..
8MacAr.thur..~~ .£.U.~-2ft,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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following message:
My sin.cere congratulations to you and
your command. You have swept the enemy
from all the Philippines and redeemed
the promises of the American people to
the loyal Filipino people • • • • I am
confident that the potverful base we are
no,J fashiontng in the :Ph:U~,ppi:nes will
play its full part i·n the final knocl< ..
out blou against Japan a:ld :restot·e tll~
world to peace, freedom, an~ aon:i.ty.4"
Strategic mistal<tHl wcr:e made by both MacArthur and

the Joint Chiefs durinf) the tin:'J of tho Pj.dlippine mop up.
~facArthur,

.as 1.t

l~ter t1.~rned

the Visayas and lt:inda11ao.

out,

co·ul~

have leapfrogged

The F:Uipiuos in these islands

were not sufferi·ag gr,;,atly and the Japanese wore cut off
from reinforcement and

end of the war.

~-1ould

have sm:reudereil anyway at the

These forces could have

and Sumatra, where the Dutch colonists
greatly.

When !-facArthur did propose

expect~d

war waa not

to end so fast.

~·ere

l':hr;.~

Chiefs should have fo'ltnd the necessary

be~n1

used :tn Java

suffering

··nova, the .Joint

S~1ippir13,

but the

The general proposed

such a plan in Ff.abruary of 19!}5, to be carried out the next
June.

Higher off:tc:tals held up thf! plan 1.111t:il August when

it waa too late.
*'..

'trK

-

I

By that t:1.me, i"'lncArthur . . w.i: all he could

f'mle.ral Dou~
•;t1 ~'(1 . ~
···iloro.Arthur-,----(-Greetl\V~l-• --·····-- --······-- - - - --~"~-~Tioh_Con.s..:td.iiJe_r-:!'::'-.-~
Co11necticut: t~awcett Publications T..nc., c. 1964), .p. 82.
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handle with the occupation of Japan. SO

CHAPTER VII

THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
The Atomic Bomb, which l-7aS dropped
Nagasaki in August of 1945,

rapid conclusion .

br ou g~t

Hir..Qshima and

Qtl .. .

the Pacific War

t

a

It was on Augus t 14, that President

Truman r ece ived the Emperor's acceptance of the surrender
terms .

The President then announced to the world that

Douglas MacArthur would be Supreme Commander of the Allied

Powers for the surrender and the occupa tion of Japan . l
On August 15, 1945, MacArthur sent the Japanese an
order by radio for "itn11l.e iate cessation of hostil"tiesu and
to send "a competent representative" t o Hani la to receive

instructions for t he formal surrender aud the receptiort of
occupa tion forces .

The date for the first landings was set

for August 26, at At sugi Airport. 2

The basic charter f or surrender and occupation was
the Potsdam Declaration of July 26 ) 1945.

Thi

doctnne11t

ordered the demobilization and occupation of "'the cou11.try

_ , - !'Kent

'aobe:rt s Greenf ield (ed .), 'I'he United St$tes
Army in World War II , (Washington D. c .:-office of Chief of
Rrrrtary Ri s to~ Department of the Army, 1960) , p . 358.

2tbid., pp . 359 ~3 60 .

-

37

eliminated~

Allied Commander

was to carry out tb.is orcler. 3
Japa1.1. as

a military

menac~tl;

second~

to collect inder.nnities and repar-

ation• demanded by count::r:ies \>Jldch haC! suffered from
Japartese

ag~:n:ass:iotq

third, to eat:ablish a "peaceful and

respous:lhle" govet·l:un.ent, pointed tm.mrd ciem.ocrat:ic principles;
and fou:r.th, to t:'ec.reat:e an t·H:onom:lc structure which t'/ould
support th(::~ islands J+
ll:tollm Sehald stated:

. • • th<.~ Occupation generally t-uas
regarded within Japan as C:"~raeral
H:acArthur ~ s one ... man shm<T. His per$Onality docrdnated cuaat'ly everything
done by the American authorit1.cs. His

many statements and press releases set
the tone of the e·ntire Occupa.t:f.or.i, and
to most Japactese he waa the fountainhead
of Allied power. • • • 5
Sebald ·want on to d:tsclose that th:is idea

'\'<TaS

pushed by

~--~~ss~Ii-·Hrines, :t!!<r~~}.t\!r~.~ d..~M-~1, (Philadelphia and
New Yo:t'l\: J. 13. Lippincott Compar!y, c. 1948), p. 44.

5William J Sehalcl wi-th Russell Brines, With !1§$;AI;thU;&'
in :!!.P..,ap, f! .2,!rSp,!Ht! .ll!!.\'l~I .2! J:h! Qccua,_t~£>!1, (New Yorkt
______!.;t_.~\-1. Nouo:~.l---lil.ud-Contpany:,-In~,~lJ}6!"..1)~,-})~-.S4 •..-~-·· ·······-- ··--~~~~--·-···-Q
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11acA:rthur·' s pol icy of remaining ·'* loof frtlm the Japanese"
\Vhich gave . him the " appearance of replacing the hithe:t:"to
Sible Emperor . n6 ·

it1aco

One of the small controver !e which ar.o
Occup tion w

~

tl~

conflict

· eern Conmi sion ,
by ba lie

during the

'\W·e ·n MacArthur and the Far

Even though the general was go ern d

nd detail d direc tives formulated in t-tashitt ton

during the clo ins d ys of the waT an

tlw beginning of the

Occupa tion, the policy was evet'ltually set up · y the Far

E tern Commi sian, composed of el ven Allied powera .which
sa

in W shington .

Th

Comrnis ion had no d:tl:' ct authority

over MacArthur, but . ent ·.7hat . a

r ferred to a

" tar

of

reference . "?
'£he J o int

hie f

for p licy deci ion re ched by the ar a
and s
tl
t

eti· a

111 ed St t e .

t1 e

th.

t he e as direat1v

Commissi on

ernment 4 This oumb some arrangem0

implementatio 1 of it
gene~

~~r.n

to MacArthur. from

cau ed dis ati faction within tA e

·: A:t:thu · '

t

re ar

i tting agency

o f Staff were the tr n

l, anticip ting wh

pol:tcy

-----

t

mlgh

t

omrois ion over

dec~~u·ons .

be

coming ,

Many
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p laced po1icy in effect without waiting for it to · be

autb.orized .a
William Sebald w .s MacArthur • . deputy on the Far

Eastern

Coromi$Si on~

and of the general'

feeling for · th16l

body he stated:

MacArthur made no

s~cret

ef his di$like

for tbe Allied Council, whieh he re garded
as an unwanted intru.s ian into he eeupa• ,

tion and an unde irable vehicle of Soviet
propaga.nda . 9
Sebal d

tated his own fee ling about the Ce

ission as

follow :

• • • :r egarded it as a. hig ly important'
elam nt in the regi
and control of
~ccup:ted Japan and a . useful t6g.anizaticm
for the United States . • ••

'ln .Je.pa.n,

neral

Ma~Arthu

was re peated by these

people f or his ben volence rather than hi

powet· .

be11e.v ed that m:J.lita>:y tlccupa.tiollS could only
f~ameworJ(

fo · ctlemo-er cy .

He

et Ul' a

The real job k d to be done by

the p o le themselves) for dem.ocr cy at "bayonet point"
would not
I Pt .

r~ot.- ,. .

It would be overthrown a ·

' 8 ib1-Ji. ; ' p.. 55 ..

9t~~cl · ) p . 62 ..

oon a . the

force was removed . ll
The general had to begin with pol itical and social
ref orms for · which thox-e was littl

precedent .

It wa

nee a ary to tmow somethina of the J p ne se history . . d

culture , for a

· ark

d to be :re toed to the beaten

Jap ne s·e to produce the will and energy

ses gains t the ir

MacArthur al igned him elf wit:h the

utocr t ,

o go ahead .

Food wa bro ght in for the p ople who were

s t arving, and the

ny of Jap n '

ener 1'

indigenou

O\m forces t>1ere ordered to eat

food products . l2

The Japanes , of their own free will, wrote into their
"

Con . titution a prov:lsion outlawin ,. war.

thia act

by

ta.tin(Q7 tha

thes

M cArthur explained

people above a ll others

"understand. atomic warfar , ' for t

y "counted their dead

and buri d th m. "13
Duri g the Occu

tion there w

• 59 .

c trov rsy over

\

'

.....
,

~

13!1i,liJqrx J.S_u tion.!.!! the Far E · ·t,
ari11g . b f~re
Committee on Armed Forces and the committee on Foreign I
t i on , Unit d
s Sen t • 82n · C0ngreae , Fir t

io , (Wa hington: Government
P• 233 .

1nting_Office, 1951),
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problems between MacArthur and the State Department.

This

was largely due to the general 1 s conducting, on his own,
business which was considered by the State Department as its
jurisdiction.

As time went on, this point was never settled,

but MacArthur was polite about the situation. 14
There were many misunderstandings between MacArthur
and Washington before the outbreak of the Korean War which
were critical enough for concern.

There were times when

the general pursued his own plans until one of his objectives
had been completed and then accepted by 'VJashington.

If

there was any complaint from Washington, MacArthur would
condemn the

11

\-Jashington interference, especially by the

State Department crowd.ulS

One issue was over MacArthur 1 s

wanting his own code to transmit messages to Washington.
Perhaps the most serious single issue between MacArthur and
State Department officials was over the status of Formosa.
This centered around a number of arguments outlined by the
State Department which minimized the importance of Formosa
in case of attack.

This was taken by MacArthur as abandonment

!4Sebald, ~·£!!.,Po 120.
15Ibid., p. 119.
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of Formosa, 16
Many rumors went around during 1949 about a State
Department takeover of the Occupation.

As this continued,

the general became more and more irritated and annoyed.
These rumors seemed to imply that the State Department

could do the job better than the general.17
~,

one occasion MacArthur charged that a State Depart•

ment clique was trying to undermine him.

This occurred

.because a British diplomat wauted to see the general and,
due to the heavy burden of Korea, had not been received.
The British Embassy in Waahington aeked the State Department about it.

They, in turn, wrote to Mr. Sebald who

consulted MacArthur.

When Mt. Sebald asked the general if

it might not be useful for him to occa81onally meet these

diplomats and brief them on Korea, MacA-rthur stated that
"this would serve no useful purpoee."lS The general then
went on in such a way that his egotism began to show:
• • • Why, as a aovereign, should I?
President Truman doesn't do so, nor

·-

. 15itid:, PP•

120•121.

-

17tbid. 1 p. 117.
--lalbtd.' P• 119.
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does the King of England or any other
head of st~te • • • • 19
It seemed as though MacArthur felt that he was performing not a single army assiwunent but an exhalted historical misaion.

He was swept up in the process of reconstruc-

tion with a feeling of spiritual purpose in a moment of
unsurpassed national disaater.20
During this time MacArthur wae often in a philosophical
mood as he contemplated hia handiwork in the Occupation.
The general ltated in 1948:
My major advisors now have boiled down

almost to two

men-~George Washington
and Abraham Lincoln. One founded the
United States, the other saved it. If
you go back into their liveaA you can
find almost all the anewers.~l

The general eeemed to know that he needed public
support. but his military background rebelled at

tl~

of either defending his actions or explaining them.

need

He

expected the aame type of absolute authority aa in wartime

and the same unquestioning eupport.

To the general, the

19Ibid,
tr" •
20aichard H. Rovere and Arthur Schleainger Jr. ,

H.tcstbur

I!!!

Coptrp~J:II.!!.!! Anterf.can Fot,9i.s9 fctlic;x:, (Ne'(v York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, e. 1951), p. 87.
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critic was t\npatriotic and dangerous.22

There was another old problem of the general's that
showed itself during this period of occupation, and th:f.a
was hie seneitiveneae to preaa critieiam.

The press kept a

close watch on the Occupation and there was plenty of
criticism.

Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,

in their book The

~~t~~ Con~tgvet•I•

state:

The wonder of the occupation, the mount•
1ng eenee of historic mission, the pro•
tect1ve adoration of the ltaff••all theae
made the Supreme Commander's headqua!!era
morbidly sensitive to any eriticism.
A leea aeneitive peraon or a more practiced politician
would have ignored the attacke, but the general never could.

Ambaaeador William Sebald ltated:
The hypersensitive general • • • often
replied to the attacke on him • • • thua
furnishing the presa with more copy and
adding fuel to the contxoveray of the

moment.

Neither MacArthur nor hi.a

advisor• aeemed to under•tand haw often
thia tactic helped to enlarge and pro•
long ieauee that otherwile might have

died from undernouriShment.24
'

.

22Brinea, l>.E•

ill· •

s..u., p.
2r~Sebald, mm.cm. * cit.,
. J?•

23R.overe. .22•
.........

p. 68.

.
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l1acArthur made many ill·advised attempts to di8pute
publi8bed storiea in the world's newspapers.

There were

times when he launched out at repreaentativea of the State
Department for reporting what was being printed.

Ambassador

Sebald stated that in 1948 he was ordered by MacArthur "to

draft a lengthy pretJs release of rebuttal, baaed upon the
accounts of the preea campaign transmitted to Tokyo in
routine State Department telegram4. u25

The quarrels between the general and individual newe
correspondents became famous while the Occupation was in
the headlines.

magnified.

Most of the time these skirmilhes were

These were battles which the general could not

win, for the last word wae always had by the preea.26
Amba11ador Sebald •tated:
• • • I waa concerned that thete public
statementa far from convincing the world
that the United States meant busineal in
Ae1a, gave aid and comfort to the enemy
by demonttrat1ng divisions in our leader•
ship and weakneeae• in our national purpoae.27
Though MacArthur wal firat of all a militaris=, he

....

2olb1d.

'"'2Sib:td~

--

p. 113.

J.

·······--···---
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found h1lll$el£ bogged dotvn with problems of economics and
human psychology.

This was completely a new experience.

From the outset three goals were to be accomplished.

Firat,

to insure that Japa:rt would not become a major menace to the

United States or to the peace of the world; second, to bring

about the eventual setting up of a peaceful and responsible
government; and third, the clear United States objective of
keeping Japan out of the Communist camp.28

The first two

goals were achieved quickly, but the other was a little
harder to accomplish.
Ambaasador t\lilliam Sebald stated:

The achievement of the three major objec·
tives was in large measure the result of
the initiative of General MacArthur •••
But even MacArthur might have been
impotent if Washington had failed to
recognize in time that the pressures of
evente had out dated many of the carefully
prepared plans for conducting the
Occupation • • • • 29
One of the general' a biggest accomplishmeuts il1 Japan
waa land reform.

Land ownership was in the hands of the few

at the close of t\forld War II.

In t-wo years time, about five

million acres of land changed hands.
28~.: p. 293.

29JJ&g., p. 294.

About two million
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t enants bee
agll'icult~re

Thi$ m.ade it pOSJible for Japa11 1 s

e !andownet· •

to be one of the quickeSt national activitie$ to

:recover. 30

General MacArthur has stated that he believed that "the
t e1i'Jllin tion of tnil1t•ry hoatil:l.tiea Should be a definite
thing . n

He e.l$() stated that the Japanese t:eape.cted and

a&lired the American way of life .

They had been told that

Am rica wae the mQ$t bt:utal of all nationa ~ but when they

found that this we. not true, they wanted "to follow us and
to copy what we did . u31

"l"Owalt . Sheldc>n, the bno,r abl! ~pnJu~xor.!: The Oe.cw~!t?n
of Japan, 194!l•19S ~ (New YOt-Ju Tile Maemillan CQlilpany. 1965J.
pp . 10~,.203.

•

c ·

t--- - - - ----lo.l.Jear:lng.,O)l •.~:!£ .

,

p-

31D~., ~---=.--,-. ------~---------

CHAPTER VIII
THE WAR IN KOREA

vmen World War II came to a close Korea wee divided

at the 38th Parallel, and its internal affairs soo1.1 became
chaotic.

The United States and Russia became involved in

a dispute over the division of the peninsula.

In December

of 1945, at the Foreign Ministers Conference in MOscow. it
was decided to establish a joint
over Korea,

u.s ...

U.. S.S,R. Commission

The United St:a.tee tried to uae this commission

to set up some type of agreement for nearly two years, but

no decisions were possible,l
In 19l}7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that

45,000 troops stationed :ln Korea be evacuated.

It wa1 felt

that thie would uot impair the military poaition of the
United States iu the Far East,2
General MacArthur agreed with the Joint Ch.iefe in
favoring the withdrawal of troops a.t this time.

In September

_.. ·· !wii'i'iantJ. Sebald with Russell Brinee, tvifh .Ha~Ar.th¥}:
!!! Japan: .A !e~!9ntl .rasto;r;x .2£;· d~e 9fCUJUtt1on 1 New Yorio
W, w. Norton a~d Company, Inc., c. 1965), pp. 177•178.
---

_

_ ~~~y S, u'J.'rU!'llan, !!@oi£81 Y~ars of TJzta,l .fll..2 ~·
(New Y.'C41,. Doubleday and---eompauy,-1.-nc. , 1956 , p-;----3-25.
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of 1947, the general said that "there was nothing peculiarly
threatening at that time in Korea. 11 3 He also went on to
state that there had been considerable pressure from South
Korea for the removal of these troops.

President Truman

stated that our commander in Korea, Lieutenant General John

R. Hodge, reported that the Koreans felt that under the dual
occupation no real freedom or independence could be accomplished, and that "they wanted their independence and were
beginning to think that the Allied powers were not sincere
in their promise."

Hodge also added that "it was growing

daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government
would not greatly improve as long as the dual occupation
eontinued."4
When the North Koreans plunged across the 38th
Parallel in 1950. the American government received its first
report from the United Press News Service instead of from
the military personnel in Korea.

General MacArthur was

3Militarx Situatign !n the Far !!!£, Hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, Firat
Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951),
pp. 242- 243 •
4Truman, .!m. .ill• , p. 318.
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,'1Sked for a report.·5

area.

l~hen

i.t

completf!d, he said that the South Koreans

~·TMJ

~'7ere

in sood defens5.v.e posi tlons anil shotud be able to hang

on.

ThE~

eencral indicated that upon h.is retu:rn to Tokyo he

"t.;rou.ld :request comm:l tmet"1t of Uni tecl States troops. 6
The

Pres:lden~::

unanimously
repulsed.

agret~d

of t:!1e Hni ted States and his advisor a

tl'•a.t the North. Korean invasion must: be

As Trum.an stated, thera was nan almost unspol\en

acceptance on the part of: everyone that v1hat ever had to be

dona to m.ect thie aggrension had to he done. n7

The Un:i.ted States official policy \vas that it

~7a8

reeponding to the aggression :ln Korea as part of a concerted
United Nations actlon, just as were other members of that
body.

It was understood that

tt·~e

United States would be

the major contributor because of its interest in the Jlacific.

The United Nations Security Council, on July 7, 1950, set

Siotin-w."·spardel:, !!:!! !£UtqfLJl•·l:f!cArJ:.h.Ht Con trgy.!!'f.~l!
n.nd the Kore:J:n Vat :~ (New Yorl<: W. W. Norton and .Company,
"in'C.:C.T9-6S), p. 21.
'
..- ·

6 Hal ter Kar1.g ~ Malec 1m lJ. Coyle, and Frank A•.Hanson,
!P.~~~ +\eEOI!=.: ~ tvSI .!!1 Korea~ (New York: Rinehart and
Company, Inc., 1952), p. 55.
.

7Truman, .22•

ill•,

p. 334.
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up the only

wot·kabl~ arrange~uent

by n:comrnending that a

unified command be established in Korea, and that tne United
States name the commander.8
President Truman :immediately ordered MacArtnur to use
American air and naval power to St:tpport.

Army.

th.f1

Sout.h Korean

The American fot·ces we:t'e, however, to limit the:tr

operations to the area
MacArthur let 'l'nnmm

and asked for

.a.

bt~low

~-·now ho~;r

tl.J.e 3l3t.h parallel.

\<lhen

desperate the situation \vas,

c.ounter-offensive, the President authorized
All three branches of the A'llerican

him to use ground units.

armed services were comm:itted.9
There was sorne concern about MacArthur's appoint1nent

to this new a.ssigumeut.

James Reston, in b:ls column 1.n the

New York -··
Times,
stated:
...

..,._..,.,...__........,

is a sovereign pot,Jer in
~tis Dl\"l:l r:1.gtit, wi tn s tubbot'n coufl.deuce
:i:n his own judgment. Diplomacy and vast
eo11corn for the opinions ar1d seasitiveness
of others are the political qualities
essenti.al to this new assignmeut, and
these are precisely tile qualities General
I1acArthur h.as been accused of lacking in
. • ..

HscAl:·ti~ur

B}i;,~·~YJ. 'Middleton,

J!.iJ!,!;;!?r.:t £! ~ ~9.1:e~·9
!'li!r, (New York: Hawth.orn Books Inc.~ 1965), p. 53.

9Truman, .2!!.•

ill· ,

.!.ill! ,C_q~y_Eact

pp. 337-338.
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the past.10
This

statE-~ment

began to show itself to be true; MacArthur

still seemed to lacl< these qualities.
\~hen

it looked like the ground situation in Korea was

desperate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a directive which
not only gave MacArthur control of the Seventh Fleet, but
also gave him permission to attack military targets north
of the 38th Paralle1. 11
General MacArthur, during the Senate investigations
following his dismissal, stated of his early defensive
tactics in Korea:
• • . I felt that it was entirely problematical whether we could save any remnants
of the South Korean Army or establish any
position in Korea. My directives were to
establish a beachhead in the neighborhood
of Pusan and take such steps as I felt I
could within the means I possessed to
support the Korean government and help
maintain the South Koreans.12

The general's immediate problem was to halt the
advance of the enemy ground and flank units,

The force that.

MacArthur had to work with was worn out from World War II,
16column in the ~
llKarig, £2•

£!!.,

12Hearings, ~·

.!2.£.!

Times, July 9, 1950.

p. 44.

£1£.,

pp. 231-232.

and had old equipment frorn this period

He had reque sted

lso .

mor e troops, but had been turned down
by Washington
.
--··
............ ---,,,

-~

reason for t his wa

the

--

~~-----.-

One

,.

that in the first d rk 6 ys of

fa~t

the w r, Washington w s haping for

speedy

contai~nt .

This was because it was felt ·that Korea might be a move to
divet·t attention from an amphibious move elsewhere . 13

One of the big problems that arose duri.ng the Korean

War was .the question over the

u~e

of Fortno an troops,

In

the early days of the war HacArthw; had adv sed .a gainst t he

use of Form.o

n troops i.n

'\<iould not only we ken

t

~orea

beeau e he felt t hat t his

a t country •· · defense, but that t hey

would need so much lo is tical training th<at t hey "would be

I

I
\

an 4lbatross

round Gur neck f 0r mot"lths . nl4

general wanted to use these troops

~he

L$ter the

gainst t he

a~inistration •s

, 15

Pres ident Trum n s nt

veri 1 Harriman on a

m~ s&ion

to speak with MacArth r a d clear up the que tion of Formosan
troop s~.

When the meeting

hoped

t t hi s would ele r up the situation, but t hese hopes

t

........_____ __---I3""'M""!'i~d"!""'!"'!l~·e-ton, .2!.

ll~Ibid . , .p . 98 .

15 lbid . , p . 99 .

-

d taken place, t he Pres.ident

.ill• , p •

43 9
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we~ce

soon shattered.

A :f:ew weelcs later the general sent a

message to the V1aterans of Foreign Ha.rs criticizing American•

For.~losnn policy .15
One of the outstanding events of ti1.e Korean \1!ar
tbe

Inc~20n

Invasion.

.Tl.1e

original idea for an

land:f.ng at Inc bon -v:ras General

~lacArthur

~~:~as

a.mp~y.f.b:lous

's and his n1one.

Tli.e idea. was conceived in. early .July aud the general had
ar;:_;ued for :tt ~v-ttl:1 every

Far Eastern Ttl!f,atc:;r.

senior military cmmnander :J.n the

l'nis was to 'be the tnost brilliant

military success :in a cat:eer o£ many successes, but also
the start of a chain of events tJhich was to lead to his

reruova1. 17
The day after Seoul fell, HacArthur stood on the banks
of the Han River planning his next move.

He dec:l.ded on the

amphibious invasion of the Port of Inchon on the west coast
of

Korea.

Th:i.s

port was about 25 miles from Seoul.

This

seeraed to be the natural operation for £'1acArthnr to think
of, for. it \.rae this type of maneuver ·\.;rhich had brought him
his successes of Horld \-Jar Ir.l8

1 -,

~~!'.axi.g,

.Q.E.• cit., p. 159.

18 r1iddleton, 9.2•

ill•,

p. 102.
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The obstacles to the Inchon invasion wer e great , but
so lfere the opportunities .

General Edward A. Al mond ,

MacArthur ' s Chief of Staff , sta ted that this wa

the "wor

t

possibl e place f or an amphibious a s ult, but it was also
the only place where our as sault would c rry out its
purpose . .. 19

enemy .

This purpo e was to cut off and destroy the

A ucces ful landing would force the North Koreans

to retre

t

in two pl ce

t

off the Pusan beachhead .
forces next to

This woul d pl ce the United Nations

he princ pal supply routes that ran north
cArthu _ stated that "the history of ·

nd south of Seoul .
war pr ove

once and would ta e the pre sure

that nine out of ten t imes an army has been

destroyed becau e its
The pl an

upply lines have

ad many critic ,

against them all .

He insist d tl

een cut of£ . ' 120

nd the general stood
t

only th

capture of

Inchon and Seoul would accompli h what he w nted•• "to cut
the enemy '

supply line and

e 1 off t he entire

outhern

peninsula . n He had a talent for a forceful presentation,
but often left many logical question unanswered .

The

orities were more concerne4 with t he problems Inchon

20Ibid .

-

' '
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created. 21
MacArthur admitted that Inchon's problems were important, but were not impossible.

He added that "Inchon will

not fail; Inchon will succeed, and it will save 100,000
lives."

The general admitted that he realized "that Inchon

is a 5000 to one gamble, but I'll accept it.n22
In replies to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur
insisted on Inchon as the place of invasion.

He stated

that the "very arguments you have made as to the imprac•
ticabilities involved will tend to ensure for me the element
of surprf.se.

For the enemy commander will reason that no

one would be so brash as to make such an attempt."23
There were also charges that the Inchon plan was no
secret.

On September 16, 1950, the!!! York Tribune stated

that Inchon was one of the worst kept secreta.
known all over Korea and Japan.

It was

The article also stated

that if the North Koreans did not know it, they were the only
ones who did not.

Even army field commanders were using this

news to bolster troop.'.·morale along the front.
21Middleton, ~·

The local

£!!., P• 105.

22Ibid•

--------------------~------------------------------------------------------------

23spanier, ~· cit., p. 79.
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population must have known, for th.e build up of men a11d
equipment was being done in their full view; it would h.ave
been impossible to hide it.24
Many times in his career the general had displayed
over-confidence; now he displayed this again.

He Bade such

stateoents as: ilt,Je shall laurl at Inc"':.ton and T sb.all crush
them!"25

The use of the first person seemed to betray a

'10:

givi.ngs about tht-::1 ehoice of Inc~1on were erased. 11 "' 0

Tht:

Tides 1 ihl:t ted :it to four dated .. September fifteenth) October eevenb.1, tlove,Tther

Sl~'-!Oi.ld

The sencral chose the first ctatA, for it would

third.

only l.'el Jeve the strain. on the tb:-erl tro<.lp.S
would le. t l;he people

z~

.)Kari ~,
v
··1n
.~·

¥1\10 -.·~m1ld

···1· -~

-~;_·,

A.t

?.nd
~ot

eusan, but it

be l tberated in th:ln area

p·• lr-,9
v.
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factor was the opposition to the plan; this made the general
believe that the enemy would not think he would risk it.27
The Inchon landing turned out as MacArthur had pre ...
dieted; his brilliantly conceived ar.d sldllfnll't

~xecuted

operation caught the eaemy completely i'Y surpr:i.s::,

history of warfare.

The general iutd ga.r11bled

~d t:h

VvYry

dis as t:er

,, :P

anrl it had beeu successful!-.;
The Hri tis~~

ni~toriau.

David

R.e(;S

C!escribes Inchon as

n:r.t cvme £rom Ids ov,;:r·po\--leril"Ag personality

bt1.t HacArtltu:c,':

and hi9 self·· conJ::hltntcc. n29

it~

·,_..i.tim.al.:e results it seamB amhi;:uoqs.

Its vet::y success

meaut that the Cni ted Nations war aims ~Jere r·aisecl b.:om the
t

3t1th :t·ara.llcl to t~1t: Ya.lu ldve:t·. JO

ryn
.... 0 Ibl~
•
'-~•,

-

rlJe

'{1

C. •

2J1Javitl h.ees, !s!EJ;..q: 'Hi.~ Lf,,dtcd ~::.!X.) (Loudo.u:
Macl"iillan .c:n1d Compa.r:~y~ Ltd.7!964);·~~p: 9G.
30 ,...,
q,J.·......
.-l
~-
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The controversies that surrounded MacArthur•s plan
for Inchon did not disappear with the victory, but were
hidden in an avalar1cl'1e of praise which flooded him.

question of whether the invasion waa
still stood out.

For many, this

t:.1o :rlst{ or not

~,;orth

qucstio·~1

The

has .';wd no .a.nswer.

Even though ti.1e general professed to see tne:r: it ii.l. tne

objections of h:ts critics, he seemed to more strongly
indicate that he was actually resentful and contemptuous of
them.

He discarded their obJections as "timid:tty and

defeatism.n 3 l
The very success at lnc::ton l·Ton,s>lt up a:nother point.
It left little doubt that if a difi.:tcult

slt·~ta.tion

't.;rould

come up again, MacArthur would prefer again to use L1is m-m
judgment rather than need th.a advice of

t>K~

Joint Chiefs of

'}/b

Staff.'"""'
By the ena of September virtually all of South Korea

( w a s it1 Allied hand• and the liorth Korean force

\

l:·'lacArthur callt.HJ

t:Lt

l-iaS

shattered.

Ute t:mehlY to, SLtrrcndcr. on October 1, but

There was now a great deal of eolid
military reason

fol~

carrying

tht:~ v~a.:r

into the north.

There
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was much debate on the issue, but finally, through the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, President Truman authorized MacArthur, in
a series of messages in late September, to go beyond the 38th
Parallet.33

The general had asked for more men, and here again one
of the same suspicions that he had had in early World War II
crept up.

The general felt that the reason for the lack of

reinforcements was that Asia was being placed near the bottom
of the list of American il1terests.

He

once again had the

idea that Asia was being sacrificed to Europe. 34
All of the general's instructions regarding his planned
operations in North Korea stipulated that his authority to
operate was valid only if there were no signs of Chinese
intervention. 35

On

October 9, MacArthur received directions

which changed these instructions slightly.

He was now

permitted to pursue the war in the north, even if Chinese
involvement was encountered.

The general was told that he

could move north as long as he thought that the forces
' llMiddleton, ~.
34spanier. ~·

£!£.,

ill·,

35Middleton, ~·

p. 119.

p. 82.

£!!., p. 130.
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now under his control had any reasonable chance of success.
The instructions also stated: "In any case you will obtain
authorization from \oJashington prior to taking any military
action against objectives in Chinese territory.n36
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the general that as a

The
11

matter

of policy" only South Korean troops should be advanced into
the northeastern provinces bordering the Soviet Union and
along the Manchurian border. 37 Secretary of Defense Marshall
wired MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically
-...

and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel."38~-~
On October

15, P1:esident Truman summoned

~lacArthur

to

a meeting at Wake Island to discuss the last phase of the
United
Nations involvement in Korea.
, __

The President asked

the general what the chances of Chinese intervention would

be and

~facArthur

gave a very optimistic answer.

He

estimated that the Chinese had 300 .ooo troops in Ma.rtchuria,
and that only 58,000 to 60,000 of these could be moved

across the Yalu River.

These the general felt could be

destroyed by his air force.

Even as MacArthur was giving

his optimistic reply four Chinese armies 120,000 strong
~6Truman, .2.2•

ill•,

p. 362.

37Hearings, ~· ~., pp. 1216, 1217.
38tbid., P• 132.

-
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were moving into positions opposite the United Nations
forces.

These were soon joined by lBOtOOO Red Chinese

troops which moved to the northern border of the Yalu River •39
The real tragedy of the conference 'f\las the fact that

there had been no realistic attempt to come to gTips with
the great issues that stood between these two men. 40

Ambassador William Sebald stated:
MacArthur compared his forthcoming meet ...
ing with President Truman to his World
War II journey to Pearl Harbor for a major
conference with President Roosevelt.41
At Pearl

f~rbor

MacArthur had convinced President Roosevelt

to authorize a return to the Philippines which the Navy
had proposed to by-pass.

Now the general had prepared for

another such conference.42

President Truman had called this Wake Island Confer•
ence mai·nly because there seemed to be a fundamental
difference between the MacArthur and l!Jashington vieto;rpoint
on the Korean r.twar.
• • • '11

T1..11e ...... in disaareement
was over the
o
a<Q

39Middle'ton, SW.• £.!:!• , p. 127 •

-

40Ibid., p. 132.

41sebald,

~·cit., p.

217.
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relative ilnportance of Europe and Asia in global strategy.
This was an old disagreement; it was a hold-over from 'Vjorld

Ha.r II.

HacArthur believed that the Communists would conquer

Europe through Asia if not stopped, but the administration
kept on building up forces in Europe.43
General H.acArthur launched his "Home for Christmas"

or November Offensive knowing that there were at least
100,000 men facing him and 40,000 guerrillas behind him.
He also knew that the size of his assa.ul ting force was

inadequate for a frontal attack.

The general split his army

in two, taking a tremendous gamble, creating an attractive
and fatal vacuum.

Being confident of success, he made his

military dispositi.ons not on the assumption of massive
Chinese Communist intervention, but on the enemy that
existed.

MacArthur stated that he was limited by the size

of his force and the mission given him.

This mj.ssion was

to clear out all North Korea and to unify it. 44
The appearance of Red Chinese forces in the war caused
concern in Korea that was not shared in Japan.

~~hen

Washington, worried ab-:-ut re!:,orts of this, asked MacArthur

44Spanier,

~·

£!!.,

p. 122.
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£or an evaluation, be warned against 'thasty conclusions. n 4 5

Two days later the general be1an to sound the al rm order•
ing hi s air force to bomb six major bridges aeross the Yalu
River.

of Staff immediately countermanded

The J oint Chief

the order and rem1t'ided

~fac.At-thu

allowing A111 d pl. n

to strike

river.

of

~1th1n

The gener 1 ;:i.ent back a

urprised the Jo.int Chief

restriction not
five mile s of this

trong protest which

because it was so different from

the previous mess ge$ " The Joint Chi fa then authorized
- - - -· _. .•••

-

-

--~·

-

-· ··-· - -

_ .,... ____ ........ + •

MacArthur to bomb the Yalu .....
br:ldg
s ~ .but only
-..
..... .front . the Korean
~

'

side . 46

'' \.

n

i;l. '.(...k. ·,

,

'--t' CA."d'

0

'

·:-

~ \t

. )

\~)\ ,v~( ·~e

Gener 1 MaeArthur stated t

t

the reason$ for his

November defe ts were the restriction& "without precedent

in h.:t tory," wh:toh
base

d prevented hf.tn from bombing supply

in Manchuria, or even the Manchurian side of the Ya.lu

bridge · , and followin
bor.de~.47

enemy planes over the Manchurian

In time he would even 4ee treason in these

Later the general stated that his November Offenaive
w a of a ·r.econnai sanee n ture .
_lflli._,.. ,.,

46lbig. , P• 138 ,
47~bl9 · , p. 157.

To thie General Mara hall
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pointed out that no general launches a reconnaissance with
his whole army.

He holds his main force to the rear a a

precaution, particularly when the enemy might possibly

drive a wedge between t:wo wings of his army thereby roll•
1ng up the flank and ~ear of either or both. 48
General Collins stated:
I don't believe that in the initial phase
it was considered aa reconnaissance in
force at all, because General MacArthur
wae ben.t upon destruction of the North
Korean forces.49

In his memoirs, President Truman stated:

Non· no one is blaming General MacArthur,
and eerte.inly 1 never did for the failure
of the November Offensive • • • But I do
blame General MacArthur for the manner in

which he tried to excuse his failure ••
50
.
• •
The President has stated tM.t MacArth\.•r misinformed him,
and he has strongly implied that he '\\Tould not have ordered

the north,it"lU:'d advance if his field commander had correctly

estimated Pet,ing 'a inteuti.ous. 51
~8'Span1er, .22•

.ill•,

In order to eval ua:i:e thia

p. 127.

49Hear1ngs • .21!• cit., p. 1369.
50Truman, !m·

.ill•,

p. 381.

·····--- - - 51-tbid•-,~3%3-.-- - - - -

--······-----

--

(
).J.\J

wos past even for Soviet

of Ght:n.ese ground forces supported by Russian Air Force.)2
Possibly tho gonc:ral

t'>TRB

not so concerned because he b..s.d been

allot-ved perm1.ss1.on to bomb fmd blockade ll.orth Koree a.ft;er :i. i;
atte.cked; therofore, he m:i.eht he.ve e.:;:pected 1;o recet vc
perra:tssion to bornb

~:md

blockade Communist; Ch.inc 1;oo if sb.o

MacArthur later stated that "the
disposition of those troops • • • could not have been improved
upon, hs.d I known the Chinese were going to attack."54
The general charged espionage for the failure of his
l1ake Island prediction.

This seems to point our that

Jv1acArthur must always be 110 per eent rlgbt.

It could not

be that he had made a :mistake; it had to be that he was

-

$2Ibld., PP• 383-384.

£!!., P• 92.
.2£• ill•, P• I •

53Spenier, 2£•
54-Hearings,
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destroyed by enemies at home.

This betrays a curious atate

of mind, for it seems as though he feared that his great

record would be wiped out by a mistake.

The general himself

had often made the statement: "I have always been able to
take care of the enemy in front, but have never been able
to protect my8elf from the enemy in the rear."55
The general was the figure of a sad and lonely
commander, with great victories to his credit, fighting to
avoid any defeat which might mar hil last command.

He

believed that the change of policy in Korea was, rather

than a military matter. a political one.

He never changed

from this idea.S6
General MacArthur 1 a concept of the Korean War came

out in an interview Ambassador William Sebald held with the
general on November 14. 1950.

MacArthur said that the

immediate objective was to destroy the bridges acroas the
Yalu River and thus isolate the area between the United
Nations forces and the North KoJ:ean border.

He went on to

say that if this failed. he saw no altemative to bombing

S5span1er,

.sm.. .£!.S. ,

56Middleton, R2•

p. 94.

£!£.,

p. 155.
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key points in Manchuria.57

By late 1950, it was clear that there were two 1rreconcilable viewpoints to the war.

Washington was looking for an

l10norable end to the conflict, while MacArthur thought we

should have vietory.58
On

November 28, 19 50, MacArthur aunounced that 1'heavy

Chinese reinforcementsu were in the nprivileged sanct:uaryll

of Manchuria and that now "we face an entirely new war.o59
In December, t1acArthur submitted a plan to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for bringing the war to an end.

This plan

encompassed four ideas any of which Washington felt could
enlarge the tvar. 60

ri'he first called for the intensifica-

tion of our economic blockade against China; the second was
tt~

imposition of a 11aval blockade against the China coast;

the third called for the removal of restrictions on a.ir

reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria;
and fourth, the removal of restrictions on the forces of

-

.. "5'1

.'

Sebald,~·£!!.,

p. 203.

58tbid., p. 220,
59~., p. 204.

60Middleton, .22• cit., p. 159,

119
Nationalist China on Formosa. 61

Tt~ general later testified:

• • • In my own professional opinion,
Comraun1s t China, its pcn.,-,et· to t1age
modern war has been tremendously
exaggerated; and I believe when \ole
place pressure, the blockade pressure,
and the disruptive pre•aure of the air,
on it• distribution systems, that sb.e
would be forced to yield w~Fhin a
reasonable period of time. ,J2
The Joint Chiefs of Staff set.lt r1acArthut· orders to
hold in Korea if he could with

tt1e

tt·oops he

under the reatrictions now in effect.

11a~:..;

had and

The general felt that

this would subject his command to severe losses and that
nthe issue really boils down to the question of whether or

not the United States intends to evacuate Korea.n63

He

l.;tter stated that, in his opinion, he could hold on in Korea

for any length of time up to the complete destruction of his
own forces, if such a course was dictated by political con-

siderati~ns or factors.64
."--

Pre1ident Truraan issued a statement announcing that :tf

62 Hear1.nes, 9.£..
63 Middleton, 9..11•

£ll. , p.

58.

ill•, P• 1.60.

64 Hearings, .QR.• ~.!!·, p. ,488.

/
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continued resistance should not prove possible with the
force a under MacA.'t'thur 's command, and

"~i thdra,qal

from Korea

became necessary; that the United States "shall not accept
the result politically or militarily until the aggression
hat been rectified. n 6 5

This was t:al\cn by Ma.c.Arthur as an

indication that .America had decided not to 1vin in Korea.
The general sent a message to tl::.e Co1mnanoer in Chief
of the Veterans of Foreigll Wars arguing that -w·hat t-vas needed

was "aggressive, resolute, and dyaarnic lei!adership • a and
that "nothing could be more fallacious than the thre.adbare
argument by those who advocate appeasement a11d defeatisrn' 1
that we would alienate Asia if '''e defendE.1d Formosa. 66
f'resident Truman

~.ras

irritated by this letter p-ublishing

the idea that the government in "t,Jashinr;to1'l v:ras :::·esponaible

for MacArthur's troubles for limiting the fighting to Korea.
The thillg that galled the President most \'Tas the general' a
giving public voice. to his resentruents. !)7
On March 20, MacArthur wrote a letter to a member of

the House of Representatives • Joseph H. Martin, in answer

65Midd.leton, ..9..2· .£ll., pp. 151·1&2.
66ft:g,_!.q., p. 354.

67~1iddletoa, 9£•

£..:ti•,

p. 157.
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to n address Martin had made •ugges.tlns the use of Nationalist
Chinese troop . in Korea.

Th1

letter wa a challenge to

e iit1ng national policy of· the Unit d St tea .
paragraph reached a elimax with the

t

The las t

tement$ '·' There is no

&ubatitut for -· v:tctory.,n68
,.. .
.,
President Truman felt that thi

letter

hawed that the

general was not only in dieagreeme t with the policy of the
government, but waG challenging th

s

nation to his Commander- in- Chief. 69
that .,there

as there are

wrong fr

a ri l

$

a.r

insubordi~

The President st ted

kind and wrong kind of victory, jttst

ol: the right· thin

and wars that are '

every standpoint . u70

Presid nt

he w

t

policy in open

ru

. be an to d:r ft

ting that

willing to ne got ate with the Commuuiats .
to dr4ft h.

time,

own

At the

m

concluded with the · ropos 1:

• • • 1 t nd ra dy t any ti e to confer
in t 1e field with the Commander ·n Chief·
o the e
y otc in tho
t effott
to ftnd y ilitary mean whereby realiza•
tion of the political ~b etf.vee of th

•58T~urttan: o • e it., i> .
69tb d.

446 .
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United Nations ill Korea • • • might be
accomplished without further bloodahed.71
Though t'1acArthur called this a. Hroutinen message, it brought
out many problems.

11

President Truman sa:f.d that it was

croas•

purposett to the orse that he was preparing t and added: ult

would have confused the world if my carefully prepared
$tatement had been made."72
In t<Jashington tbis \\'as talH.2n a.s open defiance.

The

President thought that the and had been reached as he
stated:
• • • 1 could no longer tolerate his
insubord:I.naticm. t-iacArthur h.acl actually
threatened the enemy with an ult1.matum
intimating that the full preponderance

of Allied power might he brought to bear
against Red China • • • • 73
Th:la announceme(tt

\laS

re.nd by Pres:T.r1ent Truman on

April 11, 1950:
••• \vith deep regret I have concluded
that Geaeral of the Army Douglas MacArthur
is unable to give his t;holchearted support
to the policies of the t~1ited States
Goven1E~ent a:nd of th.e United Nations in
matters pertaining to ~:lis off:lcial dutieS

72Truman,
. .92•

.
ill··,

p. 440.
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• • • I have, therefore, relieved General
MacArthur of co!l'li:!U\nds • • • (',eneral
t1acArthur 1 s place in history as one of
our greatest commanders ie full.y esta ..

blished • • • • 74

This announcement stunned the Ame.r.ican people.

Many

He
welcrJm~

returned furme to a turault.:uous
clil.1u:u~

'•zrh:f.ch :rr.1aci.led its

with his speech ·before a jo:int snssion oJ: Co-ngress

and the Senate Hearings wh1ch follmJecl. 75
General tlacArt:hur answered the el1arge of insuborclina•
t:ion as follo-v;s:

Senator I have been a soldier fot· 52 years,
... .;- ~-imc
1··o
+- 1··., hnr:>t"'0.(! ..,.,v
I tl.,"~T~'"' .~ln ·-·;.,
t.... ·..;::'. ...
....
"' '
·-·
·..
"J
ability, carried out ~very order that was
t'?.Ver r;ivon. rne. No more $uhordinate soldier
1:188 ever 'ti1orn the Atoor-.ica.n uniform.
I
....

t, C't

~·.if"l'
l r1u
1- ~' "~•~<

.....

,,

·--~

"'

1'(YI'>':
•il-1·'"'"-~
q '~"'""'
,... ,.,.. i.. :.,.j.,..
......,.t);

q·•1\'
.,

1,:,.._1,

~.~ ---~,...

t;...~ ..:._,) ,_,_..

...o\..., l./
"'n~--c·r
..... ~- ·.-..:·~ t·
.....

{·!·:a- ~~·~
lp< ••

i~

J..

I ·v·o1'~ ld"'~t t
•

",>)

carry out any order that ,~,.as given me.
yo1J j'f\ean to so.y that tho or.dc:rs I have

'l"..."

If

carried out I l-las in agreement tdth, that is

a different matter.76
Ou
~nLJ.ra1
(~""'
"'-'
-

the qtlestJ.o.'J of Hhy tho
n.,,.,..
VL.•~.,_

~~..,...,dl-"''~>"
, 1Jc -,, .•• '<·.;

{!-7cc

~··r.gt..,..•.•T $. ,u,.
'•'-'

,..

~tm.e:rn.l

·1·.:!.>1t
;:.;,:
•
,_ .
·~

·was reli.eved,

.Jt.Z.dn. 't.

tl

n,,..c.·r·~""
'"CJ ... c

t1.,..,t
..,..

C.eneral 1-ls.cArthur was relieved because he disagreed on

--------------~~~tl~e~a~r~i=n~L~S~,~.9~=)~.~£L~t''!~-.-,~p~.--Z7._o____________________________________________
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policy,n but because ube carried it to the people and not
through the channels to the Commander-in•Chie£. 11 77
To the question that the general t11as right in what he

planned to do, General Bradley h.aa stated tnat ' 1 to have
extended the fighting to the mainland of Asia would have
been the wrong war, at the wrong time and in the

\~ong

plaee.n78
In hitJ teatimouy, General Mal.·& hall remblded the

committee of the fact that the policies of the United States
weren • t tho only ones involved.

'there were also the poli·

eiea of the United Natioue and General MacArthur waa the
United Nations con1lilalldar. 79
M.a,eArth.ur • &

c.ar:t·y;I:n}~

On. the question of General

out of ordlilr& i'tarsha.ll answered:

Uc did not violate the policy by military

action, but he took iS&tte with the policy
be fore th~ ~mrld • • • Aud created a
situation t-Jh.ere apparently l7e had two
vie-ws speaking for th:l.a cotmtry because
he was the Supreme Commander o£ those
troops o:~ those nations :1nvolved.80
The

se.~-lei'itl

hacl actually bee11 dismissed for three

78Truman, o,;a.

£!!••

__ ·19H~ar:lngs, .2.2·

p. 446.

ill•,

p·. 414.

···-~--~

-

tlOtbid., p. t1l6.
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reasons.

F~rs~,

was the fact that he had fai led to get

clearance for his statements as he had been direc ted to do
by the President; S.econd , fbecause he challenged the place of
the -President as the

na ~ion 's.

spokesman on foreign policy ;

and third, that he did not agree "t>Tith the national policy
of trying to l imit the conflict to Korea . 8 1
Ambassador tH lliam Sebal d , w·ho knew MacArthur quite
well, summed up the Korean situation as follows:
MacArthur handl ed his various cmmnand
responsibilities and the innumerable
challenges of t he situation in a
characteristic way long familiar to
Washington . Wi th his sense of history,
experience, seniority, reputation, and
tempereJnent $ he did not easily compromise when his judgment or his decisions
were questioned. Although he knew when
to conform to specific superior
authority, he did not hesitate to
advance his views vigorously . He was
never reluctant to interpret his
authority, broadly or to make decisions
and act quickly--argui ng the matter
later. Many in Washington remembered
these s e qual:tties from World War II
and resented them even more in the semipeace of the pos twar era. 82

-

Sl!bid o .

CHAPTER IX
;iUH\IlAHY AND CONCLUSION

General MacArthur's campaigns il.ave brought him much
praise.

Thomas R. :l?u:i.ll:fps has state(\ tt,st tbe ;1campaign in

the Pacj.f:J.c from Australia through tu.e Pitilipp:i.nes to .Japan

was a marvel of ingenuity."!

Gener s.l Bernard

Nom~ i' o~nery
'-'

stated that his campa:l gn proved NacArtbur to be ntt1e best
soldier the United States produced during tJorld \.var 11, 11 and
added that "iH~ :.C:nugnt a. llO':oderful t'!ampa.lgn in the Pacific. <~2

Desp:i.te

~'1eoe

a.nd many other congratulatory statements,

the general alhays .seemed to he s•.n:rounded wi tb. controversy

and friction.

Tlu·~re

and they all, in

~wn1e

seen1s

to be several reasons for this

:.va.y, poi'nt to certain aspects of the

general's personal qualities.
One point is touched •.tpon by Franl< Kelley and Cornelius

Lef~

-----,_1'0E7~

(nture b:l.ographers of. i<iacArtaur note

·\::;_;_;; t:d~:-!l',

T>\(~ Riddl;;, o:f: !-lacArt:!l·Jr, (Ne~-;r York:

Harper and Brothers, C.·l~p:-25~..

m

...

21'';omac. R. J?hill 'lps, .. MacArthur the Soldier. 11 Newsweek,
150: 16' J\pr; il 13' 1964.
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one important factor when wr ting of the
general; the wor t thing that can happen
to n army .an is to e promoted over the
heads of enior officer , f or thi wa~
precisely what h ppened t o r~cArthur .
promotion , which caused him to

'rhe general ' s rap!

become succes i vely the youngest off cer to command We
Point, then on to

ecome the yo nge

active duty, and finally, when h

t

t

1'ajor G neral on

'l"las 50 years old, the

youngest man ever to be appointed to the office of Chief of

y 1av. · b en the source of some jealousy

Sta f of the Army,

or re ent ent on the par· of; tl o e " jumped by !1acArthur . u4
One exa: ple ca
rumors of a

~ashingtor1

ou· du ing t he sie ge of

s ll··ou t :r:e c hecl t e fighting men .

Some thought that t l is was 1 pp r.d.ng be e

knowle ge tt t

not on goo
a ter
while

orld
Mars ~

ener 1

erm
\~~ar

:r hall

ue to th
I, to four

se it was common

nd Ge eral Ma Arthur were

spectacular rise of
car general

cArthur,

nd Cliief of Staff

a 1, on ly a ye r ytnmger, conti.nued in the r nk

--"3 rank Kel ley and Corn liu
~t&on. ,

ataan when

(N w Yor : Do11 lecla.y

y n , ~~~~

nd Compar~ y,

p . lOO .
4Geor ge

c.

uell, Sloan, a.n

nney , Th! ~~~.t~.h~u~r l &!?J:i• (New York:
Pearce, ·
, p . 78 .
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of lieutenant general. 5
The fr:l.ct:I.ou \Jh:lch developed

Navy had

~.;,rorse

pr<':~~Jated

between t:hc

Uor:ld i· ar II.

tn~anches

bet~veen

I1acArthur and the

'I'he diffe:cences which

of the

~::exv:lce~i afLt-:1~

th.~

disasters

about ti1e deferuw o£ the Priillppines on the part of all

bra:ncttes.

T.w pre par~ i::lons t:or de fen so

~:ere

not completed,

and Air Force, r,/to 'jnd all underestimated the Japanese

On

Corre~.~idor

t•te litu·ines developed a. suspicion that

tlmy vrere not ',qe1J .. 1H~<'!d by the high eommand.

They

~1ere

110t

·ne'.L1t1oned in co<:tl!':\tt.n:Iques, tllld two days before NacArthur left

for· Australia) 1Jnit citations

do tails to his Ghlef of Staf:i,

~"ere

orde:t:ed fox· all e:{cept

~neral

Sutherland,

w'1.10

let

it be known that tb.is was no oversight for uthe Marines had
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gotten their sha:r.·e oi: the ]l'lory in Horli\

Hm~

I, and they

stated:
Ht:.

Prcait~>~·l!.t,

:l.f yo;1 pnn1tW 1::h:i.s polic.y
h1~;::vit.!1.'.tl;• to h
dt:T'~h~tion oi: d1t: {\~•1(;!1"tcan /~rr~.y, :f !1ave no eho:i.ce

~~~it:teL

:dJ.l lefJfl

1

but tc oppOS2! you lJ<!I'l:~eL~'· ·;: ~;1 ,:::11 n::;':
J:or r:1y i!tnlU:!diate relief no Ch:'l.cf of Staff
and ..::or 1Tt~.1:.4 c :1m1t fro.1 -~;;~,~ tn: :·•y ~kt I
shall t.'!kt,~
i:t\:7.1'; n.~:~ht st:ratl'~J. t:o the
I
people.')
1

Pr·esident .7~ootwvel t d1.~oppco the prorot;e•. 1 h1lr1gt·•t

General AacA;: t;,ir.i: 1 ;;

<:t1.tS. :)
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old staff the general kept around him, and who many times
did things in his name for which he received the blame.

General Kenney stated:
MacArthur's loyalty to those who are loyal
to him and work for him 18 a wonderful
trait. It marks the leader whose men trust
him and follow him. In MacArthur'• caee it
will even tolerate a degree of inefficiency.
He cannot hurt a loyal friend. I believe
that ia why he kept some people around, in
spite of the fact that they were largely
responsible for the bed press that he had
during World War 11.10

General Kenney went on to say that he looked •Jpon those
who

worked for him as ••cotnrades in arm.• •" aud that he

would go to almost any extreme to look after and support
them if difficulties aroae. 11

In past history this same

type of loyalty eventually got General Ulysses
into serious difficulties.

s.

Grant

MacArthur stated of his staff

that it "t;ras unsurpassed in excellence" and that "no

commande-r was ever better aerved.nl2

General Kenney has stated that the confusion and
indecision prior to the Clark Field attack did "not sound
MD

•

I!IIJt • . W

ru

rr:'i-M'C*,.,?

-

Kenney, .22• cit;., p. 242.

11 Ibid. t p. 64.
-------------~- -- ------- -~12Doug-1-as-MacArthur~ 1-&Q!ini,aceneetL<lf~~YOJ:'Jc~! McGraw•
Hill Book Company, 1964), P• 13.
----~-----~--~---~~~---~---------~--
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as though MacArthur had anything to do with the handling of
the Air Force at that time . "

He went on to say that the Air

Force contact with MacArthur's Headquarters was General
Sutherland, "who received recommendations for the use of
the Air Force and who often rendered decisions in the name

of General MacArthur."lJ
The gener . l

d an extreme sense of destiny .

-Time

.M!lsazi,n,e stated:
MacArthur envisioned himself a a child
of destiny. r~ conceived nd fought
monuntental battles w,i t h huge armies like
Alexander, Caesar . and N poleon. He
viewed his times and his own acts as
decisive in history. His triumphs and
his f ilurea often thrust him into
whirh1inds of international controversy.
• • • 14

In 1940, in t he Philippines, Macklrthur told newsmen th
"it was d stiny that brought me her·e !"l5

destiny carried over to his staff as was

t

This idea of
shol~

when General

Courtney tvbi tney mentioned that t hough it seemed that
M.aeArthur•s final performance for posterity would be hts

service in Jap n , now at '10 t he Korean War

\\fSS

.,Mars last

13Kenney, .22. c,i t . , p. 83.
14"Heroes MacArthur," Time8 tfaaa!f1ne , 83:24 , April 10,
1964.

- ·

15tbf.d
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gift to an old warrior."16

It is possible that false impressions about General
MacArthur's attitude might have been due to American
correspondants using the dateline "General MacArthur's
Headquarters" over stories written in all parts of Australia
on subjects ranging from "strategic pipedreams" to "jittery
criticisms" of the conduct of the Pacific War. 17

This sort

of thing continued throughout the geueral 1 a career.

The

press was always watching what was done by someone in his

position, especially one with the temperament and personal•
ity of MacArthur.

He complained, with clear justification,

that reporters tended to tell the ttory of the war with its
emphasis on casualtiel and the trauma of combat itself
which distorted the overall picture.l8
Many times the general would fly into a rage over

press criticism and this only made matters worae.

During

the Japanese Occupation, Ambassador William Sebald stated
15Harry B. Middleton, ~ ComtUlC£ Hi§tor:t of the
Korean War, (New York: Hawthorn Book8 Inc., 1965): p. 99.
17xrving Bryant, uTrut;h About MacArthur,"~ ReR!!bl,ic,
107:851, December 14, 1942.
18Middleton, ,g,n. e~t. • p. 9~~·~.
·--~-·····~~~~

~~~····~-~
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that he sometimes tried to tell MacArthur that routine
reports were the normal procedure; but the general instead
ordered Sebald to "have the State Department stop this
criticism of the Occupation and SCAPl"19

The general just

did not seem to realize that the pr e ss i s free i n t he United
States.
The myth of MacArthur had grown during his lifetime
and one of his most dominating characteristics contributed
to it.

This was his great ego.

It was this ego that gave

the general many useful as well as negative traits.20

This

was demonstrated in an entry in the diary of Secretary of
Defense James V. Forrestal:
MacArthur never once referred to "the
Americans," or "the Ja.panese," or to
"our forces " or "their forces." Always
it was "the enemy and I" or "he and I,"
so much that it left listeners wfth the
impression of a tremendGus ego.2
The general'a useful traits impressed many people.
During World War II newsman Clark Lee stated:
l9William J. Sebald, l.Jith Mae.A rthur .!!! Japan, }!
Personal HiSts»rx of the Oecupat:~on, (New York: l~.t-1. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 112.
20cunthur, ~·

£!S.,

p. 23.

+ - - - - - - -2-l-Entry-in--the-Bi-a.ry- o-f- Por-rea-ta-1,-Beb:J;-u&r-¥- 28_,- 19-45_,,_ _ _ _ _ __
in Walter Millis (Ed.), 211~ F.orre~l!l !!!£1!!, (New York:
The Viking Press, MacMillan Company, 1951), p. 26.
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there was MacArthur)
soldier and a man
of culture, whom some hated bee use he
was both p~ophet and poet and a master of
the Eng11 h language; who could tell you
the details of every great b ttle in
h1 tory; w _e dee1 iv br in
d gr t
military knowledge should have been
occupied in pl nning gre t battle • • • • 22

General Wedemeyer at tedJ
report came
into the War Plan• »1vf.4Jion, I was im•
pre .· .ed with th sound · trategic concept
behind his proposals . How often 1 wished
that he could be in a position of
authority in our government to help tht
pl nn r of the Joint Chi f of St ·ff . Z3
Wh never

MacArthur
d other

Carlo

c'fte

tfa ·

of MacArthur•

disliked by

. y, reapeet d by many,

gre tly loved and wex:e inspired by h1m.

Gener 1

,mulo etat d that the gene2tal "aocomplished wba.t he

did in the Philippine bee .u1e he
inspire

kno~·rs

how to select and

en. "24

The extraordinary career of General
a great deal of hi

t~rical

Mae~thur

raise•

speculation on the problems of

civil•military relat:tonahips .

Me wa -

political general

Lee • They Call j l !§p~gic • (New York : The
iking Pres , 1943)• p . 234 .

'

22c!' rk

23Albert c. W demeyer , ~demexer
2orttJ, (New York:
Henry Holt and Company., c ,. 1958)., p ~ 241 .
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surrounded by controversy throughout his career.

President

Roosevelt had known this and it became evident in the
differences between Harry Truman and MacArthur in the post•
l<lar era. 25

In Korea, MacArthur had outlined a program

which was completely unacceptable to his superiors and used
hie prestige to enforce it. 26
In looking at the personal qualities of MacArthur, it
is poseible that inconsistencies were to be expected, for

he

l~d

many times in World War 11, for example, announced

victory while his troops faced the stiffest part of the

battle.

In Korea there was no excuse for the statements

he began to make to certain people after

November Offensive.

~Vi thin

tl~

failure of his

four days he was able to find

four different ways to publish his views which made it
quite plain that he or his staff were not to blame.27 There
was also no excuse for the way the general made public his
opposition
to the admln:lstration•s
policy in Korea.
I
.

there was to be criticiem, there

'~re

,1

other wayl to carry

2.5"oavid Rees, Korea: !h!. Liptit;e,d r;1r, (London:
Ma,¢Millan and Company, Ltd., 1964), p. 66.
.,
i

'"

..

'

If
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this out.
Many things have had to be cons idered and placed
together in order to get a picture of General MacArthur as
a military l eader .

Here we have a man who is driven by a

tremendous ego which will not allow him to ever be wrong .
He always had to be right.

This led the general into

verbal arguments with what he believed to be powerful
enemies who opposed him.

Many times t hese very arguments

only made matters worse and led the general deeper into
more controversy.
The general had a great sense of loyalty to old
friends .

He kept around him a group of old friends who

s hielded him from critics and items which might upset him.
The general in turn protected them.

Many times t hese old

friends made decisions in the general's name for which he
received the blame .
Another problem was the fact that MacArthur , during
World War II and thereafter, served under men he once had
under his command.

Many times old rivalr ie s entered the

picture .
The

geq~_!' s .. whole_ -~.~-~e-~_1:'__ brings

-r----civ-i-1-ver~

military authority.

up the problem of

He opposed President
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Truman's European policy just as he
policy.

The

reas~a

l~d

President Roosevelt's

for MacArthur's lack of concern for

Europe is clear from a statement he made during World War 11.
In this statement he said:
Europe is a dying system. It is worn out
and run do\vn and will become an economic
and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia
••• The hands touching the Pacific with
their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history for the next
ten thousand years.28

MacArthur continued his wartime opposition to the
Europe-first strategy after the war.

He maintained that

th:te strategy "..ras inspired by

Communists.29 The

Russia11

general argued from a military standpoint, yet MacArthur
himself at one time had stated:

• • • No single departmental head, no
matter what his particular function or
title, could or ahould be responsible
for the formulation of ••• dac1siona.30
Thus the general had agreed with President Truman that
wars were too serious a situation to be left in the hands of
the gener ala.

w.

Spanier, .:!'..!'!!, Truman•ycArthu" Contrgver§:I
ancl
Wgr, <(New ~ork: W. W. Norton and Compax1y,
lne. • c. l9u5 , p. ,,7 .
29lbid. J p. 69.

--

2BJohn
!!!!. !,<or~15

-

30lbid.'. p. 238.
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Dougla.s

MacArth~Jr

had faults and at times made tactical

errors, but his place in history is firmly intrenched.

AHli01'ATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
~-rri tten

Several of the sources used in this paper 1:;ere
by men who tfere close to General MacArthur.

These men had

a chance to nr-t only knOl-1 the general, but to observe his
actions as "re11.

One of these

li74S

newsman Clark Lee who

writes of h:f.s observations of the general.

Though the

material i.n hf.e books Dou.sll!! Mae:Sth!:!I an<l

:.!'~I

PJS1fl~

Cf!ll!

j!

may not be completely objective, it is far from

being completely in favor of MacArthur.

Much of his

material is of an eye-witness nature which discloses
valuable military facts.

William J. Sebald and Richard

Brines, in their book Wi 1i,b.

~cArf;.i!Y.:!

.!g

dt~J?Jn,

have 'tti tten

a hiatory of MacArthur and the occupation of Japan.

Sebalc:t, as
well.

amba~Jsador, t17&1

Mr.

in a poeition to observe MacArthur

This book is a first hand account of this period.

Though Mr. Sebald sometimes ahows a little too much personal
involvement, he does not aide completely with the general,

The book contains stinging criticism of the general and
bae mixed emotions about his programs.
Severs.! of the secot1dary sourees ueed in this paper

furni8h good critical material on MacArthur.
Rrivere andm Arthur Schl-e8:lngerJi:'-;-;1n-eneir

Richard H.
bootrTtu;r~l,_

_ _ · · -·······-······--
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.£;!l9 the President, t;ive an impat·t:i.al account of this contro-

subiect.
...

Though they find ml.tch. to censure about

the general, they also find much to praise.
facts to hack up the statements made and is a
l.rhieh attempts to nuti·::e sense out of

legt~nfl.

This book has
t~r:l.tical

study

John \'7. Spanier,

critical a.ccm.n:1t of this incident and po:i.nts out J..llany of the

general's

s~1ortcomings.

The sources by Gouernl Carlos P. Rom.ulo are mainly
of human interest raaterial.

Even though a great: deal of the

material in these booltB

sentimentality and hero

Sho'H

~YOrship,

Romulo does not tx-y to gloss over shortcomings of the general.
Th~ae

books furnish important: in:for.mation twen though

........

John Toland'o book ....,.....,..,.
But ...................
Not in ,Shame is on accurate
account of the early stages of t:h.e Pacific \Jar.

The author

tends to po:f.nt up the h.uman element, and :f. a W'Xittexl
l:ti-:e a novel.

':!1\lCh

This source provides good doscripd.ve material

though it generalizes a little too r.1uch.

A few of che sources have a MacArthur bias.

Frazier

describes campaign.s well, but leavee out too many important
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facts to be a definitive history of MacArthur.
muct:! :flattery used throughout the book.

There is too

Francis Trevelyan

Miller's book,.._P.oua!!J...! ~-t~~ .U~sht:e~

J.at

!£.~e~~~' also

leaves out important filets and shows too much hero•'t7orship

and praise.

It :ta a good source if used for general des..

criptions only.

General Charlea A. \dlloughby s.nd John

Chamberlain, :tn their book

.£1@pAr,t~··l:-lli.-.!?51_,

give an

account of MacArthur's activities during these years which
Many unpleasant

1$ slanted heavily toward the general.

facts are left out and many times the facts used are die•
tor. ted.

carefully

Since the booJ< seems to be bia$e d, 1 t needs to be
weighe~.

Many of the sources used in. this paper are general
h!.4tor1es of World Har II and the Korean

~·!ar.

They are

mainly used for general descriptions.

David Rees, the

English historian and author of .!52£!!!:

!!!!. .!J.mt£~

~'

gives an accurate and interesting account of military
oporations in Korea.

r~

also gives a clear and objective

account of American command troubles in the Far Eaat.

He

points up problem.e ex:tstb1g between Washington and the
American field

uae4mmofficial

c'Om.tnan~er.

t-Jalter Karig and Manson Coyle

--~:m:r.cet ·itt ~l:'ieir

hook 1i,a~~~~ .~.Port: Th,e !.Ja_mm ________
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in K3r.ea.
...........
..

Because this was wr.ittan while the

~--

pro;?:ress, it c.ontaiua some inaccuracies.

~1ar

was in

This material

supplemented th.e dEty to day reports given the newspapers.

Frnn.I<

o.

H.ough' s book,

1'.!!!

lsla-ru! War, furuishes excellent

general descriptive ma.ter1.al of the events of \"orld War II.
Though this source is :n..ainly based on the part the Marines

played in the tvat·, it: is fair in its treatmeut of all
branches of

t'I1E'~ sGr~.rices.

This book dral'lS on esseutial

Japanese and An1er:tcan document• and seems to be quite
factual.

Robert Lect<ie's work, ..~t;,;ona!!!!! ~d, furLdahes

a clear, unriased history of the Korean War.

a cotnbat r!?.por.ter atid a former marine.

Leckie was

He draws f1·om his

own lcnowledge as tmll as other ·material for thia bluut,
h1J.t fair, account.

M. Hanlon Cannon'• book, .!:f3xte:

!,etux:n !+.'l -~ Phi!J..El!ines and Louis Morton's
.t1~ !.!11t~·2J2~ne.@

~

!!:!! iall

~

are both based on offical government

Sotrcces and are published by the Department ot' tne A:J."ill.y.
These

sour(~es

co·nta.in excellent descriptions and iactli

""£,.rhich are very ably presented by these authors.

General nougla.s MacArthur's own Reminiscences
told as t:he general l·ranted them remembered.

are omitted.

B.l'e

Many truths

Sometimes descriptions go beyond the

military conception of strategy.

The complete story is
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not told, but the general gives credit where credit is due.

This source is mainly used in this paper when direct
quotations from MacArthur are needed.

This book is written

in cavalier fashion and there is a great correlation between
the way MacArthur tells the story and the way it is told by
Generals Whitney and Willoughby.
A few of the sources used are commentaries and
opinions from leading historians which are based on selected
docmdentary material.
Editor of the
~

Hanson

w.

Baldwin, the Military

.!!.!! Ygrk Times, in his

work G'reat Mistakes

.2!

Wgr, gives a documented personal statement of conclusions

from selected facts.
~ ~ompromise

Samuel Eliot Morison's worlt Strategy

also states important conclusions.

The

reasoning behind these conclusions is sound and sometimes
controversial.
There are also sources used which are from collections
of private papers or memoirs of important Washington
officials and leaders.

President Harry S. truman•s Memoirs

give important facts which are necessary in discussing the
war situation and General MacArthur.

Truman's book tries

to discredit critics and usually tells one side of the story.
Nevertheless, important facts needed in this paper are

Rosenman, 8ive
important (acts eow::nrrd.nt: tho Prcsiderxt' s relationship \-'lith
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